

Beyond Encampment? Understanding Attitudes Toward Refugee Integration

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Abstract

Most of the world's refugees live in low- and middle-income countries, where debates center on integrating those already present rather than admitting new arrivals. Yet existing research focuses largely on admission in high-income countries. We provide one of the first nationwide assessments of attitudes toward integration in the Global South, drawing on a survey of 3,326 Kenyans fielded after a reform was passed but before implementation, with embedded experiments varying policy dimension and refugee group. Support for integration is high, but citizens are less supportive of allowing refugees to leave camps than granting economic inclusion or creating integrated settlements, and support varies significantly by refugee nationality. Opposition is driven primarily by fears of crime, terrorism, and the spread of conflict. Ethnic kinship and close contact predict support, while economic factors matter little. These findings suggest that integration is politically feasible, but insecurity associated with free movement remains the largest concern.

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1 Introduction

In high-income countries (HICs), debates over refugee policy generally center on whether refugees should be admitted. Once admitted, refugees typically receive rights to work, move, and access public services. But in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), which host 71% of the world’s refugees, the central question is often not admission but integration. In many cases, refugees are permitted to enter but are restricted from working, accessing services, or living outside designated camps.¹ These restrictions can leave refugees dependent on humanitarian assistance by limiting their ability to earn income and meet their own needs. As displacement becomes more protracted and humanitarian funding declines, international organizations have increasingly promoted integration reforms to strengthen refugee self-reliance and reduce long-term dependence on aid (International Development Association, 2020).

This shift is reflected in the growing number of LMICs, including Colombia, Ethiopia, Jordan, Kenya, Thailand, and Uganda, that have adopted policies expanding refugees’ rights to employment, movement, and access to services (De Haas, Natter and Vezzoli, 2018; Blair, Grossman and Weinstein, 2022). Yet integration also has important implications for host citizens that could lead to backlash. Allowing refugees to leave camps and participate more fully in national economies and communities may heighten concerns about insecurity, social tension, job competition, and public services. Given that refugee arrivals have sometimes imposed costs on host communities and generated electoral backlash, integration reforms may carry political risks for governments that pursue them (Hangartner et al., 2019; Steinmayr, 2016; Roza and Vargas, 2021).

Despite the growing importance of refugee integration reforms, we know little about whether citizens in major LMIC host countries support them. Existing research focuses overwhelmingly on refugee admission or presence in HICs (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014; Weber et al., 2025). The smaller LMIC literature examines attitudes toward hosting, naturalization, deportation, and proximity to refugee populations, but rarely asks citizens what rights refugees should receive or whether they should be allowed to leave camps.² This omission matters because integration differs from hosting. Citizens may accept refugees’ presence while opposing their access to the same labor markets, neighborhoods, and services as citizens. Support may also vary across the specific rights granted, the refugee group receiving them, and citizens’ own relationships with refugees.

¹One in five refugees lives in a camp-like setting, and three-quarters of encamped refugees are in sub-Saharan Africa (Anti et al., 2025).

²The LMIC literature is concentrated in the Middle East (Alrababa’h et al., 2021; Ghosn, Braithwaite and Chu, 2019; Getmansky, Sinmazdemir and Zeitzoff, 2018). Research in Africa has examined naturalization and deportation preferences (Cogley, Doces and Whitaker, 2019), geographical proximity (Zhou, 2024; Betts et al., 2023), and attitudes towards refugee arrivals (Aksoy, Ginn and Malpassi, 2024). An important exception outside Africa is Allen, Ruiz and Vargas-Silva (2024)’s study of migration policy preferences in Colombia.

We examine these questions in Kenya, a major refugee-hosting country that has historically confined most refugees to camps and restricted their access to formal employment and movement. Kenya’s 2021 Refugees Act introduced reforms in three areas: economic inclusion, freedom of movement, and integrated settlements in which refugees and nearby citizens live together and share services. We fielded a survey after the Act had passed but before it was implemented or widely politicized. Fewer than 2% of respondents could accurately describe its provisions. This setting allows us to measure attitudes toward a real and imminent reform before citizens’ views were strongly shaped by partisan debate or misinformation.

Our evidence comes from a phone survey of 3,326 Kenyan citizens. The sample includes 2,510 respondents from a nationally representative survey and an oversample of residents near the Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps. The survey contains two independently randomized experiments. The first varies the dimension of integration presented to respondents: work rights and economic inclusion, freedom of movement, or integrated settlements and shared services. The second varies the refugee group referenced: refugees in general, Somali refugees, or South Sudanese refugees. We combine these experiments with measures of broader policy preferences; respondent characteristics; perceived economic, security, and cultural effects; and coded open-ended explanations of support and opposition.

Our study yields three key findings. First, public support for refugee integration is relatively high, but not everyone who supports hosting also supports integration. When asked to choose among alternative refugee policies, 43.1% select full integration, making it the most popular option. This remains lower than the 64.7% who support Kenya hosting refugees generally, while 12.3% prefer that refugees remain in camps. Thus, although support for hosting and integration is widespread and closely correlated, a meaningful minority supports hosting refugees without granting them full integration.

Second, the main dividing line is whether refugees should be allowed to leave the camps, with opposition driven primarily by security concerns. Large majorities support granting refugees work rights and economic inclusion (69%) and converting camps into integrated settlements where refugees and nearby citizens share services (73%); support for these policies is statistically indistinguishable. By contrast, support for freedom of movement is significantly lower, at 60%. Respondents explain their opposition largely in terms of crime, terrorism, and fears that refugees will bring conflicts from their home countries into Kenya. These same concerns shape attitudes toward particular refugee groups: support for integration falls almost by half when respondents are asked about Somali refugees – who are strongly associated with insecurity – rather than refugees in general.

Economic considerations matter less than expected. Support is high for economic inclusion, the policy that would most directly expose citizens to labor market competition. Measures of personal economic vulnerability, including income, unemployment, employment formality, and agricultural work, do not consistently predict support for integration. Citizens who are pessimistic about the national economy (sociotropic concerns) are somewhat less supportive of integration, but these associations are modest and inconsistent. Respondents also identify economic benefits from integration, including business growth, job creation, tax revenue, and donor-financed services. Economic considerations are therefore salient, but they cut in both

directions and do not appear to be the principal source of opposition.

Third, many of the same factors predict support for both refugee hosting and integration. Ethnic kinship and close personal contact with refugees are the strongest predictors of favorable attitudes toward both outcomes. Naming Somali refugees sharply reduces support for both hosting and integration among the wider population, while Kenyan Somali respondents are substantially more supportive of hosting and integrating their ethnic kin. Contrary to our expectations, citizens' personal economic circumstances predict neither hosting nor integration, even among people most exposed to labor market competition from integration.

This paper makes three contributions. First, it shifts the study of refugee attitudes from admission to integration. Existing research focuses mainly on whether citizens support admitting or hosting refugees, while work on integration has largely examined employment rights (Allen, Ruiz and Vargas-Silva, 2024). To our knowledge, this is the first nationally representative study of attitudes toward refugee integration in sub-Saharan Africa, the region hosting the most refugees in protracted situations (UNHCR, 2026*a*). We show that integration comprises distinct rights that activate different concerns. Citizens are not uniformly more opposed to integration than to hosting. Their resistance is concentrated on freedom of movement, the dimension that refugee encampment is designed to prevent.


Second, we identify which explanations for public attitudes toward refugees travel to integration in LMICs. As in HICs, cultural proximity and close contact increase support, while personal economic vulnerability matters little (Weber et al., 2025). However, security concerns outweigh economic competition, echoing evidence from Turkey (Turkoglu, 2026). Respondents also recognize refugees' economic contributions and frequently invoke humanitarian obligations, shared regional identity, and the possibility that Kenyans could themselves become displaced, consistent with findings from Jordan (Alrababa'h et al., 2021).

Third, the findings speak to the political viability of integration reforms. LMIC governments and international organizations increasingly promote integration and self-reliance (Miliband, 2019; UNHCR, 2025*a*), and public opposition may be less extensive than often assumed. Employment rights and service access appear more politically acceptable when refugees remain in established hosting areas, while freedom of movement faces greater resistance, especially for groups associated with insecurity. The success of integration reforms may therefore depend more on addressing security concerns than on countering fears of economic competition.

2 The Rise of “Local Integration” Policies

UNHCR and other international actors have increasingly encouraged asylum countries to enable the “local integration” of refugees into host communities (UNHCR, 2019; Hovil, 2014; Crisp, 2004; Oliver and Boyle, 2019). One of the core objectives of the 2018 Global Compact on Refugees (GCR), affirmed by the United Nations General Assembly, is to “enhance self-reliance” through decent work and free movement of refugees (UNHCR, 2021). UNHCR has also increasingly discouraged encampment and enacted policies that treat refugee camps as a last resort (UNHCR, 2009, 2014).

Figure 1: Global Liberalization of Refugee Integration Policies



Note: Integration Score uses mean employment strand and scaled free movement measure from the Dataset of World Refugee and Asylum Policies (Blair, Grossman and Weinstein, 2022). Uses World Bank classifications of countries based on annual income levels.

These shifts come in response to two intersecting trends: rising numbers of displaced people and declining humanitarian assistance. Over the past two decades, the global refugee population has nearly tripled (UNHCR, 2024). In 2025, 70 percent of this population lived in a protracted situation without expectation of repatriation or resettlement to a third country (UNHCR, 2026a). At the same time, resources to sustain refugees have contracted: UNHCR’s 2024 budget (\$10.8 billion) was only 48% funded (UNHCR, 2025a). This worsened in 2025 with U.S. and European foreign aid cuts (UNHCR, 2025c). These pressures are most acute in sub-Saharan Africa, which hosts more refugees in protracted situations, maintains more refugee camps, and receives more UNHCR aid than any other region (see Appendix).

Consistent with the GCR, local integration policies seek to foster self-reliance by enabling movement out of camps, providing access to labor markets and public services (e.g., health and education), and granting pathways to naturalization. In doing so, they aim to reduce dependence on international aid. As shown in Fig. 1, low-income countries have made some of the most significant legislative strides on integration through expanding rights to employment and movement.

3 Theory

What drives public support for or opposition to refugee integration? We begin with the broader literature on attitudes toward refugee admission and hosting, mostly developed in HICs, then consider how its findings apply to integration in LMICs. Existing research emphasizes economic and cultural concerns, with a smaller literature on perceived security threats.

3.1 Existing Research on Attitudes toward Refugees

3.1.1 Economic Concerns

Attitudes toward refugees are shaped partly by their perceived economic effects on host communities. Refugees can benefit host economies by supplying labor, increasing demand, paying taxes, and reducing aid dependence (Clemens, Huang and Graham, 2018; Legrain, 2016; Bahar and Dooley, 2019). These aggregate gains may nevertheless impose concentrated costs on low-skilled, informal, female, or agricultural workers (Ceritoglu et al., 2017; Verme and Schuettler, 2021; Lebow, 2022; Aksu, Erzan and Kirdar, 2022; Del Carpio and Wagner, 2015; Sakamoto, Ullah and Tani, 2024).

Public opinion depends less on these actual effects than on how citizens perceive refugees' impact on the national economy and on their own livelihoods. Existing research finds that sociotropic concerns matter more than egocentric ones: citizens favor refugees viewed as skilled or economically productive and oppose those perceived as burdens, largely regardless of their own economic circumstances (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014; Weber et al., 2025; Adida, Lo and Platas, 2019; Bansak, Hainmueller and Hangartner, 2016, 2023; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2015; Valentino et al., 2019). Citizens may also worry about pressure on housing and public services (Jeannet, Heidland and Ruhs, 2021; Allen et al., 2024; Allen, Ruiz and Silva, 2022; Balkan et al., 2018; Dagnelie, Mayda and Maystadt, 2023). In many LMICs, however, humanitarian funding provides schools, clinics, roads, and employment in refugee-hosting areas, allowing nearby communities to benefit from refugee presence, which increases support (Zhou, Grossman and Ge, 2023; Alix-Garcia et al., 2018; Sanghi, Onder and Vemuru, 2016).

3.1.2 Cultural Proximity and Contact

Perceived cultural threat can shape attitudes toward refugees as strongly as, or more strongly than, economic concerns (Adida, Lo and Platas, 2019; Bansak, Hainmueller and Hangartner, 2016; Alrababa'h et al., 2021; Weber et al., 2025). Across contexts, citizens are more supportive of refugee groups viewed as culturally similar or less threatening (Card, Dustmann and Preston, 2012; Adida, Lo and Platas, 2019; Adida, Laitin and Valfort, 2016; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014; Alrababa'h et al., 2021; Bansak, Hainmueller and Hangartner, 2016, 2023). In Africa, cultural proximity often takes the form of ethnic kinship across borders. Such ties can encourage more accommodating policies and improve refugees' access to employment, housing, and services (Gale, 2006; Porter et al., 2008; Fisk, 2019). For example, Blair, Grossman and Weinstein (2022) find that governments are more likely to liberalize refugee policy

when political elites share ethnic ties with populations facing persecution across the border.

Attitudes also depend on the form of exposure citizens have to refugees. Meaningful interpersonal contact can reduce prejudice and improve attitudes (Allport, 1954; Ghosn, Braithwaite and Chu, 2019; Alrababa’h et al., 2021; Campo et al., 2023), whereas geographic proximity without sustained interaction may provoke backlash, particularly during economic stress or large inflows (Hangartner et al., 2019; Roza and Vargas, 2021). Evidence from sub-Saharan Africa is mixed: Zhou (2024) links proximity to more restrictive attitudes, while Betts et al. (2023) finds no such relationship in Kenya.

3.1.3 Security Concerns

Security has received less attention than economic or cultural explanations, despite a long-standing debate over whether refugees and refugee camps contribute to conflict in host countries (Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006; Zhou and Shaver, 2021; Savun and Gineste, 2019). Existing evidence suggests that perceived security threats can worsen public attitudes. Terrorist attacks reduce support for refugees and migrants in Europe (Legewie, 2013; Böhmelt, Bove and Nussio, 2020), while in Turkey, priming Syrian refugees’ ties to militant groups increased threat perceptions among the ethnic majority but not among Kurdish respondents with ethnic ties to some refugees (Getmansky, Sinmazdemir and Zeitzoff, 2018). Similarly, Turkoglu (2026) finds greater hostility toward refugees from regions linked to rebel groups, though this may reflect pre-existing intergroup antagonism as much as perceived security risk.

3.2 Theoretical Implications For Refugee Integration

Existing research suggests that attitudes toward refugees are shaped primarily by sociotropic economic assessments and cultural proximity. Yet this evidence comes overwhelmingly from HICs and focuses on the admission or presence of refugees rather than their integration. Whether these explanations travel to LMICs – where most refugees live, and where the central policy question is the incorporation of refugees already present – remains an open question.

There are two reasons we may expect attitudes towards refugee admission or hosting in HICs to differ from integration in LMICs. First, the economic and security context differs. Many LMICs have high poverty and unemployment, large informal labor markets, and weak social protection, making employment especially precarious. At the same time, limited welfare provision may make refugees less likely to be seen primarily as burdens on the state. Many refugees already participate in agriculture, casual labor, and small businesses, and refugee-hosting areas often benefit from humanitarian assistance. With respect to security, LMIC host countries are frequently close to the conflicts refugees have fled, which makes citizens more aware of the violence refugees escaped and the humanitarian case for protecting them, but also the risk that conflict could spread across the border.

Second, the relationship between refugees and citizens is different. Integration in LMICs typically concerns populations that have lived in the host country for decades rather than

prospective arrivals. Citizens may know refugees personally, trade or work with them, speak the same languages, share ethnic ties across borders, or benefit from aid and services concentrated in hosting areas. At the same time, established refugee groups may already be politicized and blamed for economic hardship or insecurity. Extending further rights to a familiar but marginalized population is therefore a different proposition that may generate different reactions compared to admitting a new group.

For these reasons, the factors that drive public attitudes toward refugee hosting in HICs may operate differently when citizens evaluate integration in LMICs. Integration also redistributes the costs and benefits of hosting. Under encampment, these are concentrated among communities living near camps or working in particular sectors. Integration disperses these consequences across a broader population that may face economic competition or see refugees settle nearby. Accordingly, we examine how support varies across the type of integration policy, the refugee group concerned, and citizens' own characteristics and relationships with refugees.

3.3 Integration Policy Type

Integration in LMICs involves three main policy dimensions: economic inclusion, freedom of movement, and shared access to services. These correspond to the core commitments of the Global Compact's self-reliance agenda and to the three pillars of Kenya's 2021 Refugees Act. They differ, however, in the forms of incorporation they entail and the concerns they are likely to activate.

Economic Inclusion. Easing work restrictions and expanding refugees' access to permits, financial services, and professional accreditation may heighten fears of job competition. Because many refugees already work informally without permits in casual labor, agriculture, and small enterprises, egocentric concerns may be strongest among formal-sector workers competing for salaried and professional positions. However, integration policies may also expand access to banking, credit, and business services beyond formal work rights, potentially intensifying competition concerns among non-salaried workers in contexts of high unemployment and economic precarity. Consistent with this possibility, Bousquet et al. (2025) find greater hostility toward refugees among Ugandan and Ethiopian respondents who share their occupations, including informal work such as farming and cleaning.

Sociotropic concerns may also reduce support. Citizens who are pessimistic about the national economy may fear that refugee inclusion will increase unemployment. These perceptions may persist despite evidence from other regions that expanding work rights has negligible or positive effects on local workers.³

³In Colombia, expanding work rights for Venezuelan migrants improved their well-being with negligible labor-market consequences for locals (Ibáñez et al., 2025; Bahar, Cowgill and Guzman, 2022), and studies find similar results from lifting work restrictions in Europe (Marbach, Hainmueller and Hangartner, 2018; Ahrens et al., 2023). Formalizing refugee employment may also benefit informal workers by encouraging movement into formal jobs and raising informal wages (Gülek, 2024). More broadly, economic inclusion can stimulate local economies through business creation, trade, and increased demand for goods and services

Freedom of Movement. In camp-based settings,⁴ freedom of movement could have broad economic, cultural, and security implications. Camps are typically located far from major cities and near the borders of refugees’ home country (Anti et al., 2025), meaning encamped refugees are geographically separated from most citizens. In many cases, refugees may leave only with special permission and for limited purposes. Allowing them to relocate to towns, cities, and more fertile rural areas would bring them into closer contact – and greater competition – with communities that have had little prior exposure to them. This may heighten concerns about job competition in more prosperous labor markets, access to agricultural land, cultural change and social tension, and potential for conflict, particularly where refugee groups are associated with armed actors or wars in their origin countries.

Shared Services and “Integrated Settlements.” Integration policies often allow refugees and local residents to share services, but this can take two forms. In HICs, integration typically extends refugees’ access to government services, potentially generating opposition if locals perceive greater competition for scarce public resources (Getmansky, Sinmazdemir and Zeitzoff, 2018). In LMICs, by contrast, local residents may gain access to donor-funded services provided by humanitarian organizations whose presence is largely tied to the refugee population (Jansen and de Bruijne, 2020; Zhou, Grossman and Ge, 2023; Alix-Garcia et al., 2018). Uganda’s “integrated settlement” model is the most prominent example of this: refugees and host citizens live alongside one another without strict camp borders and share primarily donor-funded healthcare and education services, supplemented by government provision. By bringing tangible benefits to nearby communities, such policies may improve attitudes toward refugees (Zhou et al., 2025). They may also raise fewer concerns about movement because refugees remain locally concentrated and do not necessarily gain greater access to employment, although this may generate other forms of opposition among people living next to the camps.

These differences suggest that citizens should be more supportive of integrated settlements than of either economic inclusion or freedom of movement. Integrated settlements can deliver visible benefits to host communities while keeping refugees concentrated in established hosting areas, and may therefore generate fewer concerns about labor-market competition, cultural change, or insecurity.

H1: *Citizens express greater support for integrated settlements than for economic inclusion or freedom of movement.*

3.4 Refugee Group

Public support for admitting refugees varies across groups. Citizens tend to favor refugees seen as posing fewer economic or security threats, as culturally closer, or as having greater humanitarian need (Bansak, Hainmueller and Hangartner, 2023; Weber et al., 2025). Group

(Groeger, León-Ciliotta and Stillman, 2024; Del Carpio and Wagner, 2015; Maystadt and Duranton, 2019; Verme and Schuettler, 2021).

⁴Globally, one in five refugees lives in camps, and three-quarters of encamped refugees live in sub-Saharan Africa (Anti et al., 2025).

distinctions may be especially important for integration, which often concerns groups that have lived in the host country for years and are already associated with particular histories of contact, cooperation, politicization, or insecurity.

We therefore expect support for integration to vary by refugee group. Citizens should be less willing to extend rights to groups perceived as culturally distant or as having negative economic or security effects, whether these perceptions arise from direct experience or from elite- and media-driven political narratives.

H2: *Citizens express lower support for integrating refugee groups perceived as having negative effects on their country.*

3.5 Citizen Characteristics

In addition to the policy dimension and refugee group, support for refugee integration may also depend on the characteristics of citizens. While existing research has shown that citizens' attitudes seem to be driven less by their own circumstances and more by the profile of refugees (Weber et al., 2025), these patterns may differ in LMICs, where unemployment, poverty, and informal employment are more widespread, and where citizens are more likely to share ethnic or personal ties to refugees.

Economic Exposure. Economic concerns may shape support through both personal vulnerability and perceptions of the national economy. Formal-sector workers may be especially concerned about extending work rights, which could increase competition for salaried and professional positions. Informal and agricultural workers may be more sensitive to freedom of movement, which could bring refugees into local labor markets and areas where they already work. More broadly, citizens with low incomes, limited education, or insecure employment may fear greater competition resulting from refugees' economic inclusion or mobility. Urban residents may also oppose freedom of movement if they expect it to draw more refugees into cities, increase pressure on housing and services, or heighten security concerns. Support may further depend on sociotropic concerns: citizens may oppose integration because they fear that it will worsen existing economic problems in the country, such as high unemployment, even when they do not expect to be personally affected (Weber et al., 2025). This leads to the following hypotheses:

H3: *Economically vulnerable citizens are less likely to support refugee integration, especially economic inclusion.*

H4: *Citizens concerned about the national economy are less likely to support refugee integration, especially economic inclusion.*

Cultural and Social Proximity. Citizens who are culturally or socially closer to refugees may be less likely to view their integration as threatening. Proximity may ease concerns about cultural change and weaken the stereotypes underlying economic or security fears. In

LMICs, proximity may take two forms. First, citizens may share ethnic ties with refugee groups, especially in Africa, where ethnic communities often extend across national borders. We expect citizens to be particularly supportive of integrating refugees with whom they share ethnic kinship. Second, citizens may have close personal relationships with refugees. Because integration concerns populations that already live in the host country, many citizens – particularly in refugee-hosting areas – know refugees as their friends, relatives, and neighbors. Citizens with close contact with refugees may perceive them as less threatening and express greater support for their integration. This leads to the following hypotheses:

H5: *Citizens who share ethnic ties with a refugee group are more likely to support integration, especially of their ethnic kin.*

H6: *Citizens with close contact with refugees are more likely to support refugee integration.*

4 Context

4.1 Refugee Integration in Kenya

Before 2021, refugees in Kenya were governed by the 2006 Refugees Act and a 2014 encampment policy, which together confined refugees to designated camps, tightly restricted work permits, and allowed movement only with short-term passes.⁵ In 2021, the Kenyan Parliament passed a new Refugees Act that addressed three main dimensions of integration: economic inclusion, freedom of movement, and integrated settlements (Halakhe and Omondi, 2024; Leghtas and Kitenge, 2022). The reform, which later became known as the “Shirika Plan,” followed the adoption of the Global Compact on Refugees and the World Bank’s pledge to support policies expanding refugee rights.⁶

First, the Act sought to promote economic inclusion by expanding access to work permits, professional certification, and formal financial services, including bank accounts, credit, and mobile money. Although refugees could previously obtain work permits in principle, permits were rarely issued, and restrictions on financial services excluded most refugees from the formal economy (Venui and Iragi, 2023).⁷ Many refugees nevertheless worked informally. In and around the camps, they owned or worked for businesses, performed casual labor, and served as “incentive workers” for international organizations (Betts, Omata and Sterck,

⁵Kenya initially welcomed refugees during the postcolonial period, but its policies became more restrictive following large-scale arrivals in the 1990s (Jaji, 2022).

⁶International donors committed nearly \$200 million to the Shirika Plan, while a \$1.2 billion loan was made contingent on implementation of the Act and related reforms (Nyamori, 2024; Nasubo and Muon, 2024). The Act also contained restrictive provisions unrelated to integration and was criticized for its top-down design (Nyamori, 2024; Opanda, 2025).

⁷An exception was the Kalobeyei settlement; see Betts, Omata and Sterck (2020).

2018; Alix-Garcia et al., 2018; de la Chaux and Haugh, 2020; Jansen and de Bruijne, 2020; Teferra, 2022; Muhumad and Jaji, 2023; Betts et al., 2024). Refugees living in cities also participated extensively in the informal economy, particularly through microenterprises.

Second, the Act sought to expand freedom of movement. It allowed refugees to move within “designated areas” and created pathways for refugees from East African Community countries to obtain EAC citizenship and live outside camps. Although the scope of these provisions were unclear, they represented a potentially significant departure from Kenya’s encampment policy. Since 2014, refugees had generally been required to live in designated camps and could leave only with short-term movement passes for purposes such as healthcare, education, or business (Betts, Omata and Sterck, 2018). Consequently, 86.4% of registered refugees were based in Kakuma or Dadaab, Kenya’s two refugee camps (UNHCR, 2025*b*). Although some refugees lived in Nairobi, Mombasa, and other cities, urban registration was difficult to obtain. The encampment policy followed a series of attacks by Al-Shabaab, an Islamist militant group based in Somalia, which the government alleged involved refugees from Dadaab.

Third, the Act proposed transforming refugee camps into “integrated settlements,” in which refugees and members of surrounding host communities would live alongside one another and share services provided by international organizations. Prior to the Act, camps were formally separated from neighboring communities. In practice, however, nearby Kenyans frequently entered the camps to access aid-funded schools and healthcare facilities, seek employment with NGOs or in refugee households, and sell goods such as charcoal and firewood (Betts, Omata and Sterck, 2018; Nasubo and Muon, 2024; MacDonald, 2026). Host-community members often relied on these donor-funded services because government provision in surrounding areas was limited. Around Kakuma, for example, 69% of Turkana hosts had no formal education, compared with 47% of refugees, while host-community members accounted for an estimated 10–15% of camp healthcare users (World Bank and UNHCR, 2021). The Act would therefore remove the formal barriers separating camps from neighboring communities, allowing refugees and hosts to live in the same area and access shared services.

The 2021 Refugees Act took effect in 2022, and the government issued implementing regulations in 2024 before officially launching the Shirika Plan in March 2025. Our survey, fielded in 2023, examined all three dimensions of the new integration policy as they were understood at the time.⁸

4.2 Refugees in Kenya

At the time of our survey, Kenya hosted 654,147 registered refugees and asylum-seekers from more than 20 countries. Somalis (51%) and South Sudanese (26%) made up more than three-quarters of Kenya’s refugee population, so we focus on these two groups. The

⁸After the 2023 survey, implementation priorities shifted. Broad freedom of movement did not materialize, economic reforms remained limited, and early integrated-settlement efforts focused on municipalizing camp areas and transferring healthcare provision to the government.

remaining population came primarily from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Burundi, and Sudan (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2023).

Somali refugees are often associated with insecurity in Kenya (Otunnu, 1992; Murunga, 2009; Shahow, 2021; Sheikh, 2021). Al-Shabaab has carried out several high-profile attacks in the country, and the government has linked some of them to Somali refugees, contributing to raids, detentions, and forced relocations targeting Somali communities (Amnesty International, 2014; Simpson and Lapar, 2013; Betts et al., 2024). Somali refugees are also religiously distinct from most Kenyans, being predominantly Muslim in contrast to Kenya’s Christian majority. Economically, however, they are relatively prosperous, participate extensively in commercial networks, and are often seen as contributing to trade (Muhumad and Jaji, 2023; Betts et al., 2024). They also share ethnic ties with Kenyan Somalis, who comprise approximately 7% of Kenya’s population. These ties facilitate access to employment, housing, and business networks (Campbell, 2006; Carrier, 2016; Betts et al., 2024).

South Sudanese refugees present a different profile, raising fewer security and cultural concerns but potentially greater economic ones. They are not associated with terrorism, and Kenya has historically been sympathetic to their cause, tacitly supporting the Sudan People’s Liberation Army in the 1990s (Abdelaaty, 2021; RCK, 2024). Many South Sudanese are Christian and belong to Nilotic ethnolinguistic groups with cultural ties to several Kenyan communities, including the Turkana who host refugees around Kakuma. Economically, however, South Sudanese refugees are among the poorest refugee groups in Kenya, with low employment and high food insecurity (Sanghi, Onder and Vemuru, 2016; Alix-Garcia et al., 2018; Teferra, 2022; Betts et al., 2024). They may therefore be perceived as competitors for low-wage work or as a burden on public resources.

The two groups therefore evoke different combinations of economic, cultural, and security concerns. Somalis are often perceived as posing greater security and cultural threats, and many Kenyans view their overall impact on the country negatively, largely because of their perceived association with attacks carried out by Al-Shabaab. At the same time, they are associated with economic contributions and share ethnic kinship ties with part of the Kenyan population. South Sudanese refugees generate fewer security and cultural concerns but are seen as contributing less economically and may be perceived as competitors for jobs and public resources. Integration therefore carries different implications for each group. For Somalis, freedom of movement and formal economic inclusion could build on existing commercial and kinship networks while intensifying security and cultural concerns. For South Sudanese, integration could expand access to work and services while raising concerns about economic competition. If security and cultural considerations weigh more heavily than economic ones, we expect citizens to favor integrating South Sudanese refugees over Somalis.

5 Research Design

To understand attitudes toward refugee integration, we fielded a nationwide phone survey in Kenya from September to October 2023, after the 2021 Refugee Act had been passed but before it was implemented. A total of 3,326 people completed the survey, comprising a

nationally representative sample of 2,510 respondents and an oversample of 816 respondents from the sub-counties surrounding Dadaab and Kakuma camps (404 in Garissa and 412 in Turkana).⁹ To improve representativeness, we constructed post-stratification weights using entropy balancing, matching our sample to the 2023 Afrobarometer survey (Hainmueller, 2012). Unless otherwise noted, all analyses use these weights (normalized to mean 1 in-sample) and HC1 robust standard errors.

Studying attitudes toward a real policy before implementation offers two advantages.¹⁰ First, specific, real-world policies tend to elicit more valid responses than abstract or hypothetical scenarios (Vlaev, 2012; Kaderabek, 2022). Second, once a reform becomes contested by politicians and media, citizens’ stated attitudes increasingly reflect partisan and elite cues rather than considered evaluations of the policy itself. The Shirika Plan became politicized after our survey, including through false claims that it would grant refugees citizenship and voting rights (Capital FM News, 2024; Nation Media Group, 2025). Our survey therefore provides a relatively uncontaminated measure of baseline support: fewer than 2 percent of respondents could accurately describe the Act’s provisions.

Our research design combines two survey experiments with descriptive and qualitative data. Both experiments were pre-registered along with their corresponding hypotheses, with the treatments reflecting the policies and groups central to Kenya’s integration reforms. The first experiment varies the dimension of integration policy under consideration while the other varies the refugee group. We interpret the joint pattern across the experiments alongside descriptive and open-ended questions, as well as measures of respondent characteristics. The study was developed in consultation with local stakeholders, including UNHCR, NGOs, legal experts, and refugee-led organizations, and builds on eight months of fieldwork and key informant interviews.

5.1 Survey Experiments

Our first experiment tests whether support for integration varies by policy type (H1). We first asked respondents whether they had heard of the new refugee law and, if so, what they knew about it. Respondents were then randomly assigned with equal probability to a control group, which received no information about the Act, or to one of three treatment groups – economic inclusion, free movement, or integrated settlements (shared services) – each of which received a brief factual summary of one dimension of the Act (see Table 1). Respondents in the treatment groups then rated their support for the policy on a five-

⁹Because the nationally representative sample itself contains 78 respondents in Turkana or Garissa, the full sample includes 894 camp-county respondents in total. Analyses that condition on residence near a camp use that figure; see the Appendix.

¹⁰Our pre-analysis plan (PAP) envisioned a two-wave panel: a baseline before implementation and a follow-up tracking attitude change afterwards. Because implementation of the 2021 Act was slow, we fielded only the baseline, and the results reported here are cross-sectional. A separate national survey fielded in February 2026 repeated several items from the baseline. Because the two waves are independent samples, we report that comparison in the Appendix.

point scale. We conduct robustness checks in the appendix that exclude respondents who had previously heard of the new refugee law (1.3%) and who failed a comprehension check (12.2%).

Since the control group received no information about the Act, our primary comparison is across the three policy dimensions rather than between each treatment and the control group. We separately test whether information about a specific policy dimension affects broader attitudes toward refugees, comparing each treatment group with the control group on two measures of support for integration described below: preference for integration, from the five-option policy menu, and support for Kenya hosting refugees, from the generic arm of the nationality experiment).

Table 1: Policy experiment: treatment prompts

Arm	Prompt
Economic inclusion	<i>One of the proposed policy changes is to increase the ability of refugees from certain East African countries – including South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Somalia – to work. These refugees will be given increased access to work permits, financial services like M-PESA, and support to start businesses.</i>
Free movement	<i>One of the proposed policy changes is to allow refugees from certain East African countries – including South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Somalia – to move freely throughout Kenya. These refugees will be able to settle into new neighbourhoods and live among Kenyan communities.</i>
Integrated settlements	<i>One of the proposed policy changes is to convert existing refugee camps into integrated settlements, where refugees from certain East African countries – including South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Somalia – will live alongside local residents. Both refugees and Kenyans in these areas will be able to access services provided by donors and NGOs, such as healthcare and education.</i>

Notes: Exact wording as shown to respondents. The control arm received no policy text and was not asked the policy-support outcome.

Our second experiment tests whether support for integration varies across refugee groups (H2). Respondents were assigned with equal probability to one of the three frames: questions about “refugees” in general, “refugees from Somalia,” or “refugees from South Sudan” (see Table 2).¹¹ We measure three outcomes. First, respondents rated their support for Kenya hosting the referenced group and then explained their answer in an open-ended response, described below. Second, they rated their support for that group moving into their constituency if refugees were allowed to move throughout Kenya, which we use as a proxy for support for local integration. Both outcomes use five-point scales. Third, respondents

¹¹The two experiments are independently randomized and fully crossed, producing a 4×3 design with 261–292 respondents per cell. Each respondent is therefore assigned to both a policy arm and a nationality arm, but we analyze the two experiments separately.

assessed whether the referenced group had improved or worsened Kenya’s economy, security, and culture, each on a three-point scale.

Table 2: Nationality experiment: item wording

Outcome	Question wording
Support for hosting	<i>We now want to ask you more broadly about [GROUP]. To what extent do you support or oppose Kenya hosting [GROUP]?</i>
Explanation	<i>Why do you [SUPPORT/OPPOSE] Kenya hosting [GROUP]?</i>
Local settlement	<i>Imagine that the Kenyan government was going to enable refugees to move to different areas throughout the country. Would you support or oppose [GROUP] moving into [CONSTITUENCY]?</i>
Perceived effects	<i>Overall, do you think that the impact of [GROUP] on the following things has improved, stayed the same, worsened, or haven’t you heard enough to say?</i>
Economy	<i>Kenya’s economy, including jobs, businesses, taxes, prices, and services</i>
Security	<i>Kenya’s security, including crime, violence, and terrorism</i>
Culture	<i>Kenya’s culture, including community cohesion and identity</i>

Notes: Small capitals denote piped inserts. [GROUP] takes the value *refugees*, *refugees from Somalia*, or *refugees from South Sudan*. The same randomized insert is used across all items. [SUPPORT/OPPOSE] is piped from the hosting response, and [CONSTITUENCY] from the respondent’s reported constituency. Hosting and local-settlement support were measured on five-point scales and standardized for analysis. The explanation was open-ended and hand-coded, while perceived effects were measured on three-point scales.

For each experiment main analysis, let Y_i denote respondent i ’s support outcome, standardized to mean 0 and standard deviation 1 in the estimation sample. We estimate weighted least squares models of the form

$$Y_i = \alpha + \sum_j \beta_j T_{ij} + \varepsilon_i, \quad (1)$$

where T_{ij} indicates assignment to treatment arm j , with the baseline arm omitted. Models are weighted by post-stratification weights and estimated with HC1 robust standard errors. Each coefficient β_j estimates the average effect of arm j relative to the baseline. Integrated settlements is the baseline in the policy experiment, and the generic “refugees” frame in the nationality experiment.¹² The main analysis uses the nationally representative sample, and the covariate analysis uses the full sample with covariate adjustment.

¹²We report the work-rights-versus-free-movement comparison as a linear combination $\beta_{\text{work}} - \beta_{\text{move}}$, tested by a Wald test on the fitted model rather than by re-estimating with a different baseline.

5.2 Correlates of Support

We include a series of measures to understand how citizen characteristics affect attitudes toward refugee integration. To test H3, we measure economic vulnerability using *education*, *income*, and *unemployment*. We also distinguish forms of employment that may be especially exposed to refugee labor market participation. *Formal employment* identifies full- or part-time employees, *Informal employment* identifies self-employed or casually employed respondents,¹³ and *Agricultural occupation* identifies respondents working in farming or livestock.¹⁴ *Urban* indicates residence in a ward with a population density of at least 1,000 persons per km², based on the 2019 Kenya Census (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2019). To test H4, *Socio. econ. concern* is a standardized measure of whether respondents believe Kenya’s economy has worsened over the previous twelve months.

To test H5, *Ethnic kin* identifies respondents who are of Somali ethnicity. For H6, *Close contact* identifies respondents who report knowing a refugee who is “close to [them], like a family member, partner, friend, or neighbor.” We also include a measure of geographical proximity, *Camp county*, which indicates residence in Turkana or Garissa. All models control for *Age* and *Gender*.


We analyze three outcomes. First, all respondents choose among five refugee-policy options: integration, settlements, camps, resettlement, or return. We code *Preference for integration* as 1 when a respondent selects integration, defined as granting refugees full legal rights in Kenya. Second, we examine support for each specific integration policy within the three treated arms of the policy experiment. Third, to assess whether the characteristics associated with support for integration differ from those associated with support for hosting, we analyze support for Kenya hosting refugees within the generic arm of the nationality experiment (see Section 6.4).

For the binary preference-for-integration outcome, we estimate a weighted logistic regression on the full sample and report average marginal effects in percentage points. For the experimental outcomes, we estimate weighted least squares models separately within each treatment arm, using standardized support as the outcome. All models use post-stratification weights, HC1 robust standard errors, and the same set of citizen characteristics. Because citizen characteristics are not randomized, these within-arm analyses are descriptive rather than causal. We also explore heterogeneous treatment effects by interacting each experimental arm with these characteristics. We treat this as a secondary analysis, discussing only the relevant findings in the text and reporting full results in the Appendix.

¹³Informality is commonly proxied by self-employment in LMICs (Elgin and Öztunalı, 2021; Fox and Sohnesen, 2012).

¹⁴We measured this using keywords given when participants are asked about their occupation, including “farm,” “horticulturist,” “herdsman,” “livestock,” and “pastoralist.”

Figure 2: Preferred Refugee Policies



Note: Weighted percent choosing each policy option (nationally representative sample); 95% CIs. $N = 2,472$.

5.3 Open-Ended Responses

We asked two open-ended questions to understand the mechanisms underlying attitudes toward integration. After the policy experiment, respondents in the treatment arms described the expected effects of the policy they had been shown. After the nationality experiment, respondents explained why they supported or opposed Kenya hosting the referenced refugee group. We developed a codebook from our theoretical framework and from a random 10 percent training sample, and then coded responses for references to specific categories. The full codebook and illustrative quotations appear in the Appendix.

6 Results

We begin by describing Kenyans' overall attitudes toward refugee integration before turning to the experimental results. As shown in Figure 2, integration is the most popular policy for refugees among Kenyan citizens. When asked to choose among five refugee policies, respondents most often selected integration (43.1%), while Kenya's status quo policy of encampment was less preferred (12.3%). However, a sizable minority (33.7%) favored returning refugees to their countries of origin. Majorities also backed each of the three integration measures tested in the experiment: 73.2% supported integrated settlements, 69.3% supported economic inclusion, and 59.9% supported free movement (Figure 3). Together, these results suggest a favorable public climate for refugee integration, alongside a sizable minority that prefers repatriation.

6.1 Survey Experiments


Table 3: Average Treatment Effects

Panel A. Policy experiment: support for the policy shown (SD)			
Work rights (vs. integrated settlements)	-0.038 (0.071)		
Free movement (vs. integrated settlements)	-0.291*** (0.074)		
Work rights (vs. free movement) [†]	0.252*** (0.073)		
Joint <i>p</i> (three arms)	0.000		
Observations	1,865		
R ²	0.016		
Panel B. Policy experiment: attitudes toward integration and hosting			
	Full rights (pp)	Hosting in Kenya (SD)	
Work rights (vs. control)	4.732 (3.475)	0.100 (0.128)	
Free movement (vs. control)	-2.847 (3.335)	0.048 (0.131)	
Integrated settlements (vs. control)	0.503 (3.380)	0.167 (0.129)	
<i>Any policy</i> (vs. control)	0.677 (2.760)	0.105 (0.109)	
Joint <i>p</i> (three arms)	0.182	0.590	
Observations	2,472	809	
R ²	0.003	0.004	
Panel C. Nationality experiment (SD)			
	Integration	Hosting in Kenya	
Somali refugees (vs. generic)	-0.534*** (0.059)	-0.708*** (0.062)	
South Sudanese refugees (vs. generic)	-0.151* (0.061)	-0.191** (0.061)	
Observations	2,485	2,468	
R ²	0.052	0.086	
	Economic impact	Security impact	Cultural impact
Somali refugees (vs. generic)	0.043 (0.062)	-0.103 ⁺ (0.063)	-0.075 (0.064)
South Sudanese refugees (vs. generic)	0.058 (0.061)	0.142* (0.063)	0.058 (0.063)
Observations	2,402	2,362	2,338
R ²	0.001	0.010	0.003

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Joint p tests that all arm coefficients are zero. *Hosting in Kenya* is estimated in the generic *refugees* arm only. [†]Linear combination of the two coefficients above it, with the covariance carried through. *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, + $p < 0.10$.

Integration Policy Type. We find partial support for H1. Freedom of movement receives significantly less support than the other two policy dimensions, but contrary to our expectation, integrated settlements and economic inclusion are similarly popular (Table 3). Relative to freedom of movement, support is 0.252 SD higher in the economic inclusion arm (SE = 0.073, $p < 0.001$) and 0.291 SD higher in the integrated settlements arm (SE = 0.074, $p < 0.001$). Support does not differ significantly between economic inclusion and integrated settlements (−0.038 SD, SE = 0.071). Panel B shows no evidence that receiving information about integration policy changes broader attitudes toward integration or toward Kenya hosting refugees.

Figure 3: Levels of Support and Perceived Impact by Experimental Arm



Note: Weighted proportions on the nationally representative sample with 95% HC1 intervals; dashed line marks 50 percent. Support means a rating of 4 or 5 (somewhat or strongly support) on the five-point scale. The top panel gives the share supporting the policy the respondent was shown, for each of the three policy dimensions; the middle panel the share supporting integration and hosting, by the wording used. The perceived-impact items are three-point (negative / neutral / positive), so the bottom panel plots the share *not* reporting a negative impact. That is not a support measure and is not directly comparable to the panels above it.

Refugee Group. We find strong support for H2. Relative to the generic “refugees” wording, naming Somali refugees reduces support for local integration by 0.534 SD (SE = 0.059, $p < 0.001$), while naming South Sudanese refugees produces a smaller decline of 0.151 SD (SE = 0.061, $p < 0.05$) (Panel C of Table 3). The difference between the two named groups is 0.383 SD (SE = 0.056). Descriptively, 49.5% of respondents support refugees in general moving into their locality, compared with 41.8% for South Sudanese and 23.6% for Somali refugees (Figure 3). The same pattern appears for hosting, at higher overall levels: naming Somali refugees reduces support by 0.708 SD (SE = 0.062, $p < 0.001$) and naming South Sudanese by 0.191 SD (SE = 0.061, $p < 0.01$). Notably, naming any specific nationality reduces support relative to the abstract category.

The perceived-effects battery suggests that these differences are driven mainly by security and, to a lesser extent, culture rather than economics. Relative to refugees in general, naming Somali refugees worsens perceived security effects by 0.103 SD (SE = 0.063, $p < 0.10$). The gap between Somali and South Sudanese refugees is 0.244 SD for security (SE = 0.062, $p < 0.001$) and 0.133 SD for culture (SE = 0.063, $p < 0.05$). Descriptively, 52.7% say Somali refugees have worsened Kenya’s security, compared with 46.5% for refugees in general and 39.3% for South Sudanese refugees. Economic assessments are most negative of the three domains – 62–65% say refugees have worsened Kenya’s economy – but they vary little across groups (Figure 3). Kenyans are thus broadly pessimistic about refugees’ economic impact, but that pessimism is not group-specific and does not seem to account for the differences in support for integrating different refugee groups.

6.2 Correlates of Support

Table 4: Correlates of Support for Refugee Integration and Hosting

	(1) Preference for integration (pp)	(2) Support for work rights (SD)	(3) Support for free movement (SD)	(4) Support for integrated settlements (SD)	(5) Support for hosting in Kenya (SD)
Economic concerns					
Education (1 category)	3.72** (1.35)	-0.04 (0.05)	0.10* (0.05)	0.02 (0.06)	0.12** (0.04)
Income (1 SD)	1.85 (1.23)	0.06 (0.05)	-0.10* (0.05)	-0.00 (0.05)	0.07+ (0.04)
Unemployment	-0.79 (3.32)	-0.05 (0.12)	0.01 (0.13)	-0.05 (0.13)	-0.13 (0.11)
Formal employment	1.65 (3.74)	-0.01 (0.15)	-0.08 (0.16)	0.09 (0.14)	-0.01 (0.13)
Informal employment	0.28 (3.48)	0.04 (0.12)	0.19 (0.14)	-0.20 (0.13)	0.02 (0.12)
Urban	2.90 (2.44)	-0.05 (0.09)	-0.15 (0.10)	-0.00 (0.09)	-0.01 (0.07)
Agricultural occupation	0.12 (3.28)	-0.01 (0.13)	0.23+ (0.13)	0.01 (0.15)	0.02 (0.11)
Socio. econ. concern (1 SD)	-2.70* (1.09)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.14*** (0.04)	-0.09* (0.04)	-0.07* (0.03)
Ethnic kinship and contact					
Kenyan Somali	21.08*** (3.72)	0.38** (0.12)	0.49** (0.16)	0.29* (0.13)	0.51*** (0.10)
Close contact	6.96** (2.50)	0.22** (0.08)	0.18+ (0.09)	0.14+ (0.09)	0.25*** (0.07)
Camp county	-3.59 (2.62)	0.05 (0.09)	0.25* (0.11)	0.14 (0.11)	0.11 (0.08)
Controls					
Age (1 SD)	-5.71*** (1.18)	-0.12** (0.05)	-0.14** (0.05)	-0.08 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.04)
Gender (Female = 1)	6.20** (2.23)	0.11 (0.09)	0.05 (0.09)	0.10 (0.09)	0.12 (0.07)
Outcome mean	46.0%	3.86	3.52	3.95	3.73
Outcome SD (1–5 scale)	—	1.51	1.65	1.52	1.54
Observations	2,922	729	750	731	974
R ²	0.061	0.058	0.130	0.071	0.132

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Column 1 reports average marginal effects. Outcomes in columns 2–5 are standardised on the pooled sample, so converting to the underlying 1–5 scale requires the pooled standard deviation actually used as the divisor, which is the unweighted full-sample value (1.55 for policy support, 1.65 for hosting) and not the arm-specific values shown. The appendix summary table reports weighted standard deviations for the same items, which are slightly larger for that reason. Estimation samples are restricted only by arm and by complete cases on the covariates; respondents already aware of the Shirika Plan and those failing the manipulation check are retained. *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, + $p < 0.10$.

Table 4 reports five models examining variation in who supports integration and hosting. Column 1 estimates preference for integration in the full sample, Columns 2–4 estimate standardized support within each policy-treatment arm, and column 5 estimates support for hosting in general.¹⁵

Economic Concerns. We find little support for H3. Economic vulnerability is not consistently related to support for integration. Unemployment, agricultural occupation, and

¹⁵Column 1 is measured in percentage points, whereas columns 2–5 are measured in standard deviations. Sample sizes also differ substantially (2,922 in column 1 and 729–974 in columns 2–5), so differences in statistical significance partly reflect statistical power. All models include the Turkana and Garissa oversamples.

employment formality show no reliable association with any outcome, and none of our measures predicts support for economic inclusion, the dimension mostly directly concerned with labor market access and where economic-threat accounts would most clearly expect opposition. Education and income are the exceptions, and they point in opposite directions. Each additional education category is associated with a 3.72 percentage-point increase in preference for integration ($SE = 1.35$, $p < 0.01$), as well as greater support for free movement (0.10 SD, $SE = 0.05$, $p < 0.05$) and for hosting refugees (0.12 SD, $SE = 0.04$, $p < 0.01$).¹⁶ Higher income, by contrast, is associated with lower support for free movement (-0.10 SD, $SE = 0.05$, $p < 0.05$), though it does not predict other outcomes. Although respondents' economic position does not predict overall support, secondary heterogeneity analysis suggests that formally employed respondents are relatively less favorable toward free movement than integrated settlements, while informally employed respondents are more favorable toward free movement and economic inclusion (Appendix).

Evidence for H4 is mixed. Sociotropic economic concern is associated with a 2.70 percentage-point decline in preference for integration ($SE = 1.09$, $p < 0.05$), as well as lower support for free movement (-0.14 SD, $SE = 0.04$, $p < 0.001$), integrated settlements (-0.09 SD, $SE = 0.04$, $p < 0.05$), and hosting refugees in Kenya (-0.07 SD, $SE = 0.03$, $p < 0.05$). However, these associations are substantively small and do not survive many robustness checks (see Appendix). Overall, these findings suggest that citizens pessimistic about the economy are somewhat more negative toward refugees. But this pessimism shapes opposition to integration only weakly, and not at all for economic inclusion, the policy that would likely most directly affect Kenya's economy.

Ethnic Kinship and Close Contact. We find strong support for H5. Ethnic kinship is the strongest predictor of support for integration. Kenyan Somali respondents are 21.1 percentage points more likely to prefer integration ($SE = 3.7$, $p < 0.001$), express greater support for all three integration policies (0.38 SD for economic inclusion, $SE = 0.12$; 0.49 SD for free movement, $SE = 0.16$; and 0.29 SD for integrated settlements, $SE = 0.13$), and are also more supportive of Kenya hosting refugees in general (0.51 SD, $SE = 0.10$, $p < 0.001$; Table 4).

The heterogeneity analysis shows that ethnic kin are not only more supportive of integration in general, but distinctively supportive of integrating their own kin. Among Kenyan Somali respondents, the Somali penalty is 0.605 SD smaller for local integration ($SE = 0.149$, $p < 0.001$) and 0.748 SD smaller for hosting ($SE = 0.106$, $p < 0.001$), offsetting most of the average penalty reported in Table 3. The same respondents show no comparable shift in the South Sudanese arm (-0.045 SD, $SE = 0.156$; and 0.003 SD, $SE = 0.131$), indicating an effect specific to their own kin.

We also find support for H6. Respondents with close contact with refugees are 7.0 percentage

¹⁶This is consistent with evidence from HICs that higher education is associated with pro-immigration attitudes because it reflects values and information rather than economic concerns (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010).

points more likely to prefer integration ($SE = 2.5$, $p < 0.01$) and 0.25 SD more supportive of Kenya hosting refugees ($SE = 0.07$, $p < 0.001$). Coefficients are positive for all three policy dimensions – economic inclusion (0.22 SD, $SE = 0.08$, $p < 0.01$), free movement (0.18 SD, $SE = 0.09$), and integrated settlements (0.14 SD, $SE = 0.09$) – though the latter two estimates are less precise. Support is also descriptively higher near refugee camps. Among respondents in camp-hosting counties, 50.5% prefer integration, compared with 43.4% elsewhere.


Support is also higher for economic inclusion (78.6% versus 69.1%), free movement (77.7% versus 58.2%), and integrated settlements (84.2% versus 72.3%). However, once ethnic kinship and close contact are controlled for, residence in a camp county no longer predicts preference for integration, economic inclusion, or integrated settlements. It continues to predict greater support for free movement, however (0.25 SD, $SE = 0.11$, $p < 0.05$). This suggests that the higher support observed in refugee hosting areas is largely driven by residents’ ethnic and interpersonal ties to refugees rather than proximity alone.

6.3 Open-ended Questions

Integration Policy Type. Open-ended responses point to different concerns across the three dimensions of integration. Opposition to free movement is driven mainly by security fears: 36% of respondents in that arm mentioned insecurity, and 9% referred specifically to terrorism (Figure 4). As one respondent explained, “allowing them to move freely can bring about criminal acts.” Security was also the most common theme in the integrated settlements arm, raised by 25% of respondents, who worried that shared services could generate conflict or attract more refugees to Kenya and lead to overpopulation.


Responses to economic inclusion focused instead on economic consequences, with positive and negative assessments in roughly equal measure. Some respondents raised concerns about job competition, inflation, or favoritism, arguing that “the government helps refugees and forgets Kenyans.” Others anticipated greater business activity, job creation, demand for local goods and services, and tax revenue: “Economic growth because if they are able to work they will be able to pay taxes.” Integrated settlements was the only arm in which positive economic mentions exceeded negative ones (18.8% versus 15.7%). Respondents frequently noted that international organizations would finance the services provided: “It will have a positive effect, because it won’t affect the economy, reason being they will be under NGOs.” This is consistent with the argument that shared services in LMICs can directly benefit nearby citizens rather than simply impose costs on them.

Figure 4: Policy Experiment: Open-Ended Explanations



Note: Bars show the share of open-ended respondents mentioning each theme, in the work-rights, free-movement, and integrated-settlements arms (nationally representative sample). $N = 1,262$ respondents; $N = 1,483$ coded mentions. Dark = negative concern; light = positive benefit. See Appendix for coding.

Figure 5: Nationality Experiment: Open-Ended Explanations



Note: Bars show the share of open-ended respondents mentioning each theme, by the wording used (nationally representative sample). $N = 2,137$ respondents; $N = 2,425$ coded mentions. Dark = negative concern; light = positive benefit. See Appendix for coding.

Refugee Group. Open-ended responses indicate that security is the dominant source of opposition to hosting and integrating Somali refugees. Among respondents discussing Somalis, 31% referenced insecurity and 19% terrorism specifically, against 10% and 3% for refugees in general (Figure 5). For example, one respondent said, “Tanzanians are here and we don’t have a problem, even Ugandans are here in Mombasa and Nairobi but they don’t have a problem... but Somalis, they have Al Shabaab.” Security concerns were also somewhat more common for South Sudanese refugees than for refugees in general (16% versus 10%), though these centered on resource competition and crime rather than terrorism.

Economic perceptions, however, point in the opposite direction. Respondents expressed relatively few negative economic views about Somalis, who were often described as commercially successful or contributing positively to local markets. For example, one respondent said, “the Somali people have money and thus make the Kenyan economy to rise.” South Sudanese refugees, by contrast, were more often portrayed as economically unproductive: “They don’t help Kenya in any way in generating revenue i.e., paying taxes.” The group viewed more favorably in economic terms is therefore the one citizens are less willing to integrate, suggesting that perceived economic contribution does not offset security concerns.

Humanitarian motives also featured prominently in support for hosting. Nearly half of respondents in the control group invoked shared humanity or the need to help those fleeing danger. For example, “They are human beings like us.” Many also expressed empathy rooted in the possibility that displacement could one day affect Kenyans themselves: “They’re humans and they’re supposed to be helped. The same way it might become worse in Kenya and we run to their country. It’s brotherhood.”

6.4 Comparing Integration and Hosting

This paper has posited that attitudes toward integration may differ from attitudes toward hosting. Allowing refugees to work, move freely, and share services may raise concerns that are less salient when refugees remain in camps or outside the formal labor market. In this section, we examine what our findings show about that distinction.

Attitudes toward hosting and integration are closely related. Respondents who are more supportive of Kenya hosting refugees are also more likely to support integration. Average support for hosting rises across preferred policy options, from 2.52 on the five-point scale among respondents who prefer return, to 3.85 among those who prefer camps, 4.18 among those who prefer settlements, and 4.47 among those who prefer integration.

The two are not interchangeable, however, and there is some divergence between support for hosting and support for integration. While 64.7% of respondents support Kenya hosting refugees, only 43.1% select integration from the policy menu, and 30.8% support hosting while preferring another policy. This gap appears to be driven largely by opposition to refugees leaving the camps. In the policy experiment, support for economic inclusion (69.3%) and integrated settlements (73.2%) exceeds support for hosting refugees generally (64.7%), whereas support for freedom of movement is lower (59.9%). Most citizens are therefore willing to extend substantial rights to refugees, including beyond camp settings, but a sizeable

minority oppose freedom of movement and prefer refugees to receive greater rights while remaining in established camp-hosting areas, largely out of fears of insecurity.

We also examine whether different types of citizens support hosting and integration. We expected economically vulnerable citizens to be more accepting of hosting than integration, since work and movement rights could expose them more directly to labor market competition. We find little evidence of this. Ethnic kinship and close contact with refugees predict greater support for both outcomes, while individual economic vulnerability predicts neither. Comparing the 12.3% of the population who prefer camps with the 43.1% who prefer integration, those who choose camps are older, more likely to be male, more concerned about the national economy, considerably less likely to be Kenyan Somali, and more likely to live in a camp-hosting county (see Appendix). Residents of Turkana and Garissa are less restrictive overall, but prefer that refugees remain in the camp rather than integrate. This could reflect the aid-based benefits these local residents get from the camps.

6.5 Robustness Checks

We report an extensive set of robustness checks in the Appendix. We show that the weighted sample is representative of the Kenyan population on age, gender, province, and education, and that the treatment arms of both experiments are balanced on observables.

We probe the experimental results in three ways. First, we vary the estimator: alongside the weighted least squares estimates reported in the main text, the Appendix presents unadjusted differences in means, Mann–Whitney tests, unweighted estimates, and average treatment effects estimated using causal forests. Second, we vary the sample. We re-estimate the policy experiment excluding the 12.2 percent of nationally representative respondents who failed the post-treatment comprehension check and the 1.3 percent who were already aware of the policy,¹⁷ and we re-estimate both experiments on the full sample including the Turkana and Garissa oversamples. Third, we address possible contamination from the survey flow, in which the policy experiment precedes the nationality experiment: we re-estimate the nationality experiment using only respondents assigned to the control condition of the policy experiment, and we directly test whether receiving information about any policy dimension shifted responses to downstream questions, finding no evidence that it did (Panel B of Table 3). Across these checks, the magnitude, direction, and statistical significance of the experimental results are substantively unchanged. We also report exploratory heterogeneous treatment effects, interacting each experimental arm with the full set of citizen characteristics.

For the analysis of citizen characteristics, we first vary the specification, re-estimating the binary preference-for-integration model as a linear probability model, without covariate adjustment, and without weights. Second, we vary the variable measurement: we recode

¹⁷We retain these respondents in the main analysis because failure rates differ across the treated arms and are related to respondent characteristics, in particular education, so excluding them would change the composition of the groups being compared rather than simply removing noise. The Appendix reports the excluded estimates and failure rates by arm.

exposure to refugees using self-reported local refugee presence rather than camp geography; use a more precise geographic indicator of being in a camp constituency rather than county; replace the binary urban indicator with continuous population density; use an alternative measure of sociotropic economic concern; and examine Nilotic ethnolinguistic affiliation as an alternative measure of ethnic kinship. Third, we examine two different outcomes: a feeling thermometer toward refugees in Kenya and a measure of concern about refugee hosting as an issue facing the country. Finally, we probe functional form by relaxing linearity assumptions for continuous and binned covariates. The kinship and contact results are robust. The sociotropic-concern associations are the least stable, reflecting their small magnitude.

We expect concerns about social desirability bias to be limited in this setting. Fewer than 2% of respondents could accurately describe Kenya’s new refugee law at the time of the survey, and refugee policy was not a salient issue in national politics or media (Castillejo, 2021; Dafoe, Zhang and Caughey, 2021). Moreover, in both the closed- and open-ended questions, many respondents expressed negative views about refugees, suggesting that respondents did not feel constrained to give favorable answers.

7 Conclusion

Most of the world’s refugees live in LMICs, where the central policy question is not whether to admit refugees but whether to integrate those already present. This paper provides one of the first nationally representative assessments of attitudes toward refugee integration in a major host country in the Global South, fielded between the passage of a landmark integration law and its implementation. There are three key takeaways.

First, public support for integration is relatively high, although hosting and integration are not interchangeable. Integration is the most frequently preferred policy option and is roughly four times more popular than encampment, Kenya’s longstanding approach to refugee hosting. Majorities also support each dimension of the new integration policy. Yet support for hosting is broader than support for full integration: 64.7% support Kenya hosting refugees, while 43.1% select integration, and a meaningful minority supports hosting without granting refugees full rights.

Second, the principal dividing line on integration is whether refugees should be allowed to leave the camps, with opposition driven more by security concerns than by economic competition. When examining different types of integration policies, support for both economic inclusion and integrated settlements is high, while support for freedom of movement is significantly lower. Respondents explain this gap primarily in terms of crime, terrorism, and the risk that conflicts from refugees’ countries of origin could spread into Kenya. The same pattern appears when examining support for different refugee groups: Somali refugees, who are most strongly associated with insecurity, receive substantially less support than refugees in general or South Sudanese refugees. Economic considerations matter less than expected. Support remains high for economic inclusion, personal economic vulnerability does not consistently predict attitudes, and respondents identify economic benefits as well as costs.

Third, many of the same factors underlie support for hosting and integration. Ethnic kinship and close personal contact are the strongest predictors of favorable attitudes toward both, while personal economic circumstances predict neither and sociotropic economic concerns are only weakly associated with support. Respondents' explanations also reveal a strong humanitarian basis for support, consistent with evidence that humanitarian considerations can outweigh material concerns (Bansak, Hainmueller and Hangartner, 2016; Alrababa'h et al., 2021).

These findings have implications for research on public attitudes toward displaced populations. Much of the existing literature focuses on admission decisions in HICs and emphasizes economic and cultural threat (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014; Weber et al., 2025). Our results suggest that this framework applies only partly to countries where most refugees live. In such contexts, security concerns are the major factor associated with opposition, and nationwide economic concerns play a more limited role.

A limitation of this study is that it examines a single context, raising questions about generalizability. Nevertheless, the findings may inform research on integration beyond Kenya. UNHCR and the World Bank are promoting reforms across many refugee-hosting countries, and because we examine economic inclusion, freedom of movement, and shared services separately, our framework can be applied widely, including where governments adopt only one component. The mobility findings are most directly relevant to camp-based settings, where roughly one in five refugees worldwide, about eight million people, lives (Anti et al., 2025; UNHCR, 2026*b*). The limited role of personal economic vulnerability and the salience of perceived economic benefits may also extend to LMICs with large informal economies and limited welfare provision. Security concerns may be especially important in countries neighboring active conflicts, where integration can raise fears of cross-border instability. Comparative research should test how support varies across integration policies and these broader scope conditions.

Overall, the results suggest that refugee integration may be politically feasible in LMICs. As return and resettlement remain unavailable to most displaced people, local integration has become an increasingly important durable solution (Miliband, 2019). In Kenya, support is stronger than often assumed, particularly among citizens with social ties to refugees, who recognize economic benefits, or express humanitarian commitments. Opposition is concentrated not on integration itself, but on policies that allow refugees to leave camps and on groups associated with insecurity. Work rights and integrated settlements may therefore be more politically acceptable than freedom of movement. Moving beyond encampment will depend not only on demonstrating the benefits of integration, but also on addressing the security concerns that make mobility its most contested dimension.

Data Availability Statement

The data and replication materials supporting this study will be deposited in the Harvard Dataverse, together with the code required to reproduce all tables and figures in the manuscript.

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Beyond Encampment? Understanding Attitudes Toward Refugee Integration

Appendix

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A Study design and measurement

A.1 Survey administration and ethics

We worked with the Nairobi-based survey firm TIFA Research to conduct this research. TIFA recruited participants from its database of profiled citizens, and matched Kenyan census demographics using stratified random sampling based on gender, age, and location. We conducted an extensive in-person piloting and training period with enumerators. TIFA implemented rigorous quality control checks, including a quality control team listening to every interview to check for enumerator miscoding and to ensure that the qualitative open-ended responses had been captured correctly. If an interview was incorrectly administered, it was removed and not counted in the total survey number. We used simple treatments in the experiments that could be administered and understood over the phone.

For the qualitative open-ends, enumerators asked these questions in Swahili, English, or Somali, depending on the preferences of the respondent, and then typed the response into the TIFA’s survey software in that language. TIFA’s quality control team checked the correctness and quality of these responses before then employing translators to translate the responses into English for us to analyze.

This study was approved by our university’s Institutional Review Board. We also received Kenyan ethics approval from the Amref Ethics and Scientific Review Committee (ESRC) and the National Commission for Science, Technology, and Innovation (NACOSTI). Respondents gave verbal informed consent prior to participation. All data were anonymized before sending to the PIs to ensure participant confidentiality and privacy. Participants received small phone airtime incentives for participation, which was decided by TIFA Research based on their experience of standard payments in the sector. The participant pool was representative of the Kenyan population, and was not comprised mainly of vulnerable or marginalized groups. The research benefited all groups equally.

We conducted interviews with stakeholders and humanitarian professionals during one month of fieldwork in Nairobi and Turkana in June–July 2022 and seven months of fieldwork in Nairobi from September 2023 – March 2024. These key informant interviews guided the research design and interpretation.

A.2 Sample

The analysis draws on two samples. The nationally representative sample is used for quantities that describe Kenya. The full sample adds oversamples in Turkana and Garissa, the two camp-hosting counties, and is used for the “Correlates of support” analysis, which requires enough respondents living near a camp to estimate the relationship between proximity and attitudes. The nationally representative sample contains 2,510 respondents and the oversamples add 816 (404 in Garissa and 412 in Turkana), giving 3,326 in total. Because 78 respondents in the nationally representative sample also live in Turkana or Garissa, the full sample contains 894 camp-county respondents; that is the figure the heterogeneity and correlates analyses refer to, not the size of the oversample itself. This section reports how the nationally representative sample compares with population benchmarks, and then the distribution of every variable the paper analyzes.

A.2.1 Representativeness and weights

We used entropy balancing to weight the sample to the 2023 Afrobarometer on age, gender, location, and education.¹ We chose this benchmark over census and survey-company weights because it includes education. The unweighted sample is broadly representative by age, gender, and province but is more highly educated than the population. The Afrobarometer-benchmarked weights, which have a maximum value of 4.13, correct this imbalance. Tables 1 and 2 show that education remains significantly different under the census and TIFA weights, but not under the Afrobarometer-benchmarked weights.

¹We use Kenya Round 9 (2023) (Afrobarometer, 2023a), but could not incorporate Afrobarometer’s own survey weights. See the Round 9 report for details (Afrobarometer, 2023b).

Table 1: Population and sample proportions for key demographics

Variable	Census	Afrobarometer	Sample	Weighted Sample		
				Cens	Afro	TIFA
Age Group						
18-24	24.9	23.6	22.5	18.5	17.1	24.7
25-29	15.1	15.6	17.1	15.0	14.3	15.0
30-34	14.0	14.0	15.7	14.8	15.6	13.8
35-39	10.4	11.1	12.0	12.1	12.6	10.2
40-44	8.8	8.0	10.5	11.4	12.5	8.9
45-49	7.0	6.7	7.7	8.9	9.4	9.5
50-54	5.1	6.2	5.5	6.9	6.8	6.8
55-59	4.4	4.4	4.1	5.4	5.1	5.0
60-65	4.1	4.8	4.3	6.2	6.0	5.3
66+	6.3	5.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.8
Gender						
Male	49.5	50.0	51.8	50.0	50.0	48.7
Female	50.5	50.0	48.2	50.0	50.0	51.3
Province						
Central	11.5	13.7	11.6	11.5	10.3	13.4
Coast	9.1	9.7	10.2	8.9	10.1	9.1
Eastern	14.3	15.0	13.8	13.5	13.3	15.1
Nairobi	9.2	11.0	10.4	11.2	9.8	11.1
North Eastern	5.2	3.7	3.9	3.4	6.2	4.0
Nyanza	13.2	12.3	12.9	13.4	12.2	12.3
Rift Valley	26.8	25.3	26.4	26.0	25.5	25.4
Western	10.6	9.3	10.8	12.2	12.6	9.6
Education						
None	NA	16.3	3.5	3.7	12.5	3.7
Primary	NA	35.8	21.6	23.2	39.0	21.8
Secondary	NA	25.7	34.7	35.3	31.0	35.0
Tertiary/adult	NA	22.0	39.9	37.4	17.4	39.1
NA	NA	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3

Note: Entries are percentages. Census and Afrobarometer columns report population benchmarks; the weighted columns report sample proportions under each weighting scheme. Nationally representative sample.

Table 2: Comparing weighting schemes to the Afrobarometer sample

Variable	Afrobarometer	Weights								
		Census			TIFA			Afro		
		Census	Census t-stat	Census p-value	TIFA	TIFA t-stat	TIFA p-value	Afro	Afro t-stat	Afro p-value
Age	36.91(15)	36.8 (12.14)	-0.28	0.78	35.52 (12.34)	-3.53	0.00	36.92 (11.85)	0.04	0.97
Gender	0.5(0.5)	0.5 (0.5)	-0.01	1.00	0.51 (0.5)	0.91	0.36	0.5 (0.5)	0.00	1.00
Province	4.71(2)	4.87 (2)	2.84	0.00	4.73 (2)	0.43	0.67	4.71 (2.06)	0.00	1.00
Education	2.54(1.01)	3.07 (0.87)	19.82	0.00	3.1 (0.87)	20.97	0.00	2.53 (0.92)	-0.05	0.96

Note: Cells report the weighted sample mean with its weighted standard deviation beneath it. The *Afrobarometer* column is the benchmark and so has no test. Each weighting scheme is compared with that benchmark by a weighted two-sample *t*-test. Nationally representative sample. Province is entered as its numeric index, so its mean is not substantively interpretable and is reported only for the test.

A.2.2 Summary statistics

Table 3 reports the distribution of every variable the paper analyzes. Note that the units are not common across rows, so the mean and standard deviation columns should be read against the scale named in each row label rather than compared down the column.

Table 3: Summary statistics for the analysis variables

Variable	Nationally representative					Full sample				
	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Outcomes										
Prefers integration (0/1)	2,472	0.43	0.50	0.00	1.00	3,268	0.45	0.50	0.00	1.00
Support for the policy shown (1–5)	1,865	3.66	1.59	1.00	5.00	2,482	3.78	1.57	1.00	5.00
Support for hosting in Kenya (1–5)	2,468	3.06	1.68	1.00	5.00	3,269	3.23	1.69	1.00	5.00
Support for local settlement (1–5)	2,485	2.60	1.71	1.00	5.00	3,294	2.72	1.75	1.00	5.00
Correlates of support										
Education index (1–4)	2,502	2.53	0.92	1.00	4.00	3,315	2.63	0.96	1.00	4.00
Income (std.)	2,262	-0.14	0.92	-1.58	1.71	3,003	-0.11	0.98	-1.58	1.71
Unemployed (0/1)	2,510	0.26	0.44	0.00	1.00	3,326	0.29	0.45	0.00	1.00
Formal employment (0/1)	2,510	0.19	0.39	0.00	1.00	3,326	0.19	0.40	0.00	1.00
Informal employment (0/1)	2,510	0.39	0.49	0.00	1.00	3,326	0.36	0.48	0.00	1.00
Urban (0/1)	2,509	0.29	0.45	0.00	1.00	3,325	0.29	0.45	0.00	1.00
Agricultural occupation (0/1)	2,510	0.21	0.41	0.00	1.00	3,326	0.17	0.37	0.00	1.00
Sociotropic econ. concern (std.)	2,500	-0.00	1.00	-2.96	0.58	3,309	-0.01	1.02	-2.96	0.58
Kenyan Somali (0/1)	2,510	0.08	0.26	0.00	1.00	3,326	0.15	0.36	0.00	1.00
Close contact (0/1)	2,510	0.19	0.39	0.00	1.00	3,326	0.23	0.42	0.00	1.00
Camp county (0/1)	2,510	0.04	0.20	0.00	1.00	3,326	0.28	0.45	0.00	1.00
Age (std.)	2,493	0.23	1.05	-1.45	2.71	3,307	0.14	1.03	-1.45	2.71
Female (0/1)	2,510	0.50	0.50	0.00	1.00	3,326	0.46	0.50	0.00	1.00

Note: Means and standard deviations are weighted by the Afrobarometer post-stratification weights; *N*, minimum and maximum are unweighted sample quantities. Because the means are weighted, the standardized variables do not have mean exactly zero. The standardized support outcomes used in the analysis are divided by the *unweighted* full-sample standard deviation of the item, which is 1.55 for policy support and 1.65 for hosting; those are the divisors quoted in the main correlates table, and they are slightly smaller than the weighted values reported here. *Nationally representative* excludes the Turkana and Garissa oversamples; *Full sample* includes them, and is the basis for the covariate analyses, which need enough respondents living near a camp. Units differ by row and are stated in each label: the education index is a raw four-point ordinal, *std.* marks the variables standardized on the full sample (income, age and sociotropic economic concern), the support items are the raw five-point scales, and the remaining rows are indicators. *Support for the policy shown* was asked only of the three treated arms of the policy experiment, so that row is reported on those arms. The correlates analysis for *support for hosting in Kenya* restricts further, to the generic *refugees* arm of the nationality experiment.

B Survey experiments

B.1 Experiment balance tables

Tables 4 and 5 report covariate balance across the arms of each experiment. Balance holds on every covariate in both experiments, including province once the post-stratification weights are applied. In the unweighted data province is imbalanced across the policy arms, which is one reason the appendix also reports the policy results with an indicator for oversample membership.

B.2 Manipulation check

We include a manipulation check that records whether respondents understood the policy they were given information about in the policy experiment. We hand-coded responses, counting “don’t know” or clearly incorrect answers as failures. Overall, 11.1% of respondents in the three treated arms failed the check in the full sample, and 12.2% in the nationally representative sample, which is the rate quoted in the main text because the experimental estimates are made on that sample. Failure rates were similar in the work-rights

Table 4: Covariate balance across policy experiment arms (weighted)

Covariate	Control	Work rights	Free movement	Integrated settlements	Joint p
Age (years)	37.50 (12.00)	36.96 (11.92)	36.49 (11.38)	36.74 (12.08)	0.654
Female (%)	50.49 (50.04)	48.93 (50.03)	49.06 (50.03)	51.40 (50.02)	0.873
Education index (1–4)	2.50 (0.90)	2.56 (0.93)	2.54 (0.92)	2.54 (0.94)	0.882
Province (8 categories)	—	—	—	—	0.277
Observations	633	591	639	647	

Note: Nationally representative sample with post-stratification weights. Cells are weighted means with weighted standard deviations in parentheses; *Female* is a percentage. Joint p tests that the covariate is equal across all arms: a Wald test on the arm coefficients from a weighted least squares regression for age, gender and education, and a design-based Rao–Scott chi-square for province, which is categorical and so has no meaningful mean. Significance: *** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, † $p < .10$.

Table 5: Covariate balance across nationality experiment arms (weighted)

Covariate	Refugees (generic)	Somali refugees	S. Sudanese refugees	Joint p
Age (years)	36.67 (11.68)	36.81 (11.87)	37.27 (11.99)	0.690
Female (%)	47.19 (49.95)	51.30 (50.01)	51.47 (50.01)	0.278
Education index (1–4)	2.51 (0.93)	2.56 (0.92)	2.53 (0.91)	0.651
Province (8 categories)	—	—	—	0.867
Observations	816	848	846	

Note: Nationally representative sample with post-stratification weights. Cells are weighted means with weighted standard deviations in parentheses; *Female* is a percentage. Joint p tests that the covariate is equal across all arms: a Wald test on the arm coefficients from a weighted least squares regression for age, gender and education, and a design-based Rao–Scott chi-square for province, which is categorical and so has no meaningful mean. Significance: *** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, † $p < .10$.

Table 6: Manipulation-check failure by treatment arm

Arm	N	Failed	Percent failed
Work rights	821	81	9.9
Free movement	844	82	9.7
Integrated settlements	833	114	13.7
Control	828	—	not asked

Note: The comprehension item is scored only for respondents shown a policy, so the control arm has no failures by construction. Responses were hand-coded on a five-point scale and failure is defined as saying outright the wrong thing or giving no answer. Respondents whose audio was unavailable or whose response was not coded are treated as passing, so the percentages in the table are shares of all respondents in the arm rather than of those with a usable coded response. This table is on the full sample; the corresponding rate on the nationally representative sample, which is the sample the main-text experimental estimates use, is 12.2 percent. Across the three treated arms failure rates differ ($\chi^2(2) = 8.56$, $p = 0.014$), driven by the integrated-settlements arm. For the work-versus-movement contrast that the main policy estimate rests on, failure is balanced ($\chi^2(1) = 0.00$, $p = 0.98$). Failure is also unrelated to the crossed nationality arm ($p = 0.95$) but is jointly predicted by respondent covariates ($\chi^2(5) = 13.48$, $p = 0.019$), most clearly education (−0.018, SE 0.008 per category).

and free-movement arms but higher in the integrated-settlements arm, and were also related to respondent

characteristics, especially education. We therefore retain all respondents in the main analysis, since excluding failures would change the composition of the treatment groups. Table 6 reports failure rates by arm.

The first column of Table 7 is the sample used throughout the paper. The second drops the respondents who fail the comprehension check. The third drops respondents who report prior awareness of the Shirika Plan. Every estimate is close to its counterpart in the main analysis, and the ordering of the three policy dimensions is identical in all three columns.

Table 7: Policy experiment: average treatment effects on alternative samples

	Main sample	Excl. failed check	Excl. Shirika-aware
Work rights (vs. integrated settlements)	-0.038 (0.071)	-0.056 (0.075)	-0.043 (0.072)
Free movement (vs. integrated settlements)	-0.291*** (0.074)	-0.343*** (0.079)	-0.289*** (0.075)
Work rights (vs. free movement) [†]	0.252*** (0.073)	0.287*** (0.076)	0.247*** (0.074)
Joint p (three arms)	0.000	0.000	0.000
Observations	1,865	1,639	1,840
R ²	0.016	0.022	0.016

Notes: Weighted least squares on the nationally representative sample with post-stratification weights and HC1 robust standard errors in parentheses. The outcome is support for the policy shown, standardized. Integrated settlements is the reference arm, as in the main analysis. Column 1 is the sample used throughout the paper, which retains both respondents who fail the comprehension check and respondents reporting prior awareness of the Shirika Plan. Column 2 drops the 229 respondents (12.2 percent) who fail the check; 3 of them did not answer the support item and so were already outside the estimation sample, which is why the Observations row falls by 226 rather than 229. Column 3 instead drops the 25 respondents who report prior awareness of the plan. [†]This contrast is not estimated directly; it is a linear combination of the two coefficients above it, with the covariance term carried through. Joint p tests that both arm coefficients are zero. *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, + $p < 0.10$.

B.3 Survey flow

The policy experiment precedes the nationality experiment in the instrument, so in principle a respondent’s nationality-experiment answers could be affected by the policy information they had just received. We check this in two ways.

The direct check is reported in the main text. Because the five-option policy menu and the general hosting item both follow the policy vignette and are asked of every arm, including the control, they can be regressed on the policy treatments against an untreated baseline. Neither moves: the omnibus tests that all three policy coefficients are zero return $p = 0.182$ for preference for integration and $p = 0.590$ for support for hosting – the values reported in Panel-B of the main average-treatment-effect table – and no arm-specific or pooled coefficient is distinguishable from zero.

The indirect check is reported here. Table 8 re-estimates the nationality experiment using only the respondents assigned to the *control* arm of the policy experiment, who received no policy information at all before the nationality frame. If the policy vignettes were contaminating the nationality results, the estimates in that subsample would differ from those on the full sample. They do not: every coefficient keeps its sign and its significance, and the differences are well inside sampling error, with standard errors roughly twice as large on a quarter of the respondents.

B.4 Additional specifications and estimators

The main text estimates both experiments by weighted least squares. This section reports three alternative specifications, each relaxing a different assumption of that estimator: unadjusted differences in means with a non-parametric test, which drops the weighting and the interval-scale assumption; estimation on the full sample including the Turkana and Garissa oversamples, which changes the population; and average effects from causal forests, which drop linearity. All three reproduce the ordering of the policy dimensions and the direction and significance of the nationality effects reported in the main text.

Table 8: Nationality experiment among respondents who received no policy information

	All policy arms	Policy control only
<i>Integration</i>		
Somali refugees (vs. generic)	-0.534*** (0.059)	-0.484*** (0.122)
S. Sudanese refugees (vs. generic)	-0.151* (0.061)	-0.171 (0.125)
Observations	2,485	624
<i>Hosting in Kenya</i>		
Somali refugees (vs. generic)	-0.708*** (0.062)	-0.633*** (0.125)
S. Sudanese refugees (vs. generic)	-0.191** (0.061)	-0.239+ (0.127)
Observations	2,468	620

Notes: Weighted least squares on the nationally representative sample with post-stratification weights and HC1 robust standard errors in parentheses. Outcomes are standardized. The generic *refugees* wording is the reference arm. Column 1 uses all respondents; column 2 uses only those assigned to the control arm of the policy experiment, who received no policy information before the nationality frame was introduced. Policy arm is randomized independently of nationality arm, so the restriction does not compromise the nationality randomization; it costs roughly three quarters of the sample, which is why the standard errors roughly double. *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, + $p < 0.10$.

B.4.1 Unadjusted differences in means

Table 9 reports the unweighted difference in arm means, with a Welch t -test and a Mann–Whitney rank-sum test. The Mann–Whitney test assumes neither that the five-point support item is interval-scaled nor that its distribution is symmetric, so it guards against the possibility that the main results depend on treating an ordinal scale as continuous. Estimation is on the nationally representative sample, so the only difference from the main-text estimate is that the post-stratification weights are dropped. All three pairwise policy contrasts are reported, alongside both nationality contrasts.

The pattern matches the main text — the ordering of the three policy dimensions is the same — but the gap between integrated settlements and work rights is larger without the weights (0.106 SD, against 0.038 SD weighted) and consequently sits at the edge of conventional significance. Here the two tests straddle the threshold, with Mann–Whitney at $p = 0.045$ and the Welch t -test at $p = 0.058$ on identical data, while the weighted estimate in the main text is indistinguishable from zero ($p = 0.59$). Neither figure clears a correction for the three pairwise policy comparisons ($0.045 \times 3 = 0.135$), and the confidence intervals in both versions span zero comfortably.

Table 9: Difference-in-means in support across experimental arms

Contrast	Mean (base)	Mean (comp.)	Difference	t	p (t -test)	p (M–W)
Policy: Free movement vs. Work rights	-0.23317	-0.03651	0.19666	3.3648	0.0008	0.0008
Policy: Integrated settlements vs. Work rights	0.06941	-0.03651	-0.10593	-1.8957	0.0582	0.0451
Policy: Integrated settlements vs. Free movement	0.06941	-0.23317	-0.30258	-5.3604	0.0000	0.0000
Nationality: Refugees vs. Somalia	0.16295	-0.36320	-0.52616	-11.3151	0.0000	0.0000
Nationality: Refugees vs. South Sudan	0.16295	0.04563	-0.11732	-2.4139	0.0159	0.0165

Notes: Nationally representative sample, so that the only difference from the main-text estimate is the absence of post-stratification weights. Entries report unweighted means in each arm (base and comparison), the difference in means (comparison minus base), and two-sided p -values from Welch two-sample t -tests and Mann–Whitney (Wilcoxon rank-sum) tests. The outcome is the five-point support item standardized on the pooled sample, as in the main analysis, so the means are in standard deviations; standardizing is a linear rescaling and leaves both test statistics unchanged. The full-sample counterpart is Table 10.

B.4.2 Estimation on the full sample

Table 10 then re-estimates both experiments on the full sample, adding the Turkana and Garissa oversamples to the nationally representative respondents. Note that assignment to the policy arms is mildly unbalanced with respect to oversample membership in the realised sample (χ^2 $p = 0.046$; the work-rights arm contains 230 oversample respondents against 186 in the integrated-settlements arm), whereas the nationality arms are balanced ($p = 0.73$). We therefore report the full-sample estimates both unadjusted and with an indicator

for oversample membership (Column 3). The two agree closely.

Table 10: Both experiments estimated on the full sample

	Nat. rep.	Full sample	Full sample (+ oversample ind.)
<i>Policy experiment: support for the policy shown</i>			
Work rights (vs. integrated settlements)	-0.038 (0.071)	-0.040 (0.058)	-0.056 (0.057)
Free movement (vs. integrated settlements)	-0.291*** (0.074)	-0.265*** (0.061)	-0.271*** (0.061)
Observations	1,865	2,482	2,482
<i>Nationality experiment: support for integration</i>			
Somali refugees (vs. generic)	-0.534*** (0.059)	-0.506*** (0.050)	-0.505*** (0.049)
S. Sudanese refugees (vs. generic)	-0.151* (0.061)	-0.180*** (0.051)	-0.178*** (0.051)
Observations	2,485	3,294	3,294
<i>Nationality experiment: support for hosting in Kenya</i>			
Somali refugees (vs. generic)	-0.708*** (0.062)	-0.683*** (0.052)	-0.682*** (0.051)
S. Sudanese refugees (vs. generic)	-0.191** (0.061)	-0.205*** (0.050)	-0.200*** (0.050)
Observations	2,468	3,269	3,269

Notes: Weighted least squares with post-stratification weights and HC1 robust standard errors in parentheses. Outcomes are standardized. Column 1 is the nationally representative sample, as reported in the main text. Columns 2 and 3 add the Turkana and Garissa oversamples. Treatment was randomized across all respondents, so the full-sample estimates are unbiased for the full sample; what changes relative to column 1 is the population described, since the oversamples over-represent the two camp-hosting counties. Column 3 adds an indicator for oversample membership, which is the one covariate meaningfully imbalanced across the policy arms in the realised sample; age, gender, education, income and urban residence are all balanced, and the nationality arms are balanced on oversample membership as well. *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, + $p < 0.10$.

B.4.3 Causal forests

The pre-analysis plan specified causal forests alongside the regression estimates (Wager and Athey, 2018; Athey et al., 2019). They assume neither linearity nor additivity, so they check that the results are not an artefact of the linear specification. Each pairwise contrast is fitted as its own forest, since a forest takes a binary treatment: three for the policy experiment, two for the nationality experiment. Covariates and post-stratification weights match the main specification, so functional form is the only thing that changes, and we report average effects rather than individual-level predictions, which are too noisy here. Estimation is on the full sample, as throughout the correlates analysis, because camp county is one of the covariates the forest splits on and only 78 nationally representative respondents live in a camp county. Table 11 reports the results, which agree with the weighted least squares estimates in sign and significance throughout.

Table 11: Experiments: average treatment effects from causal forests

Contrast	ATE	SE	z	p	95% CI
Policy: Work rights vs Free movement	0.207	0.062	3.36	0.001	[0.087, 0.328]
Policy: Work rights vs Integrated settlements	-0.066	0.061	-1.07	0.285	[-0.186, 0.055]
Policy: Free movement vs Integrated settlements	-0.275	0.064	-4.27	0.000	[-0.402, -0.149]
Nationality: Somalia vs Refugees	-0.460	0.050	-9.16	0.000	[-0.558, -0.361]
Nationality: South Sudan vs Refugees	-0.135	0.054	-2.52	0.012	[-0.240, -0.030]

Note: Average treatment effects implied by a separate causal forest for each pairwise contrast, since a causal forest takes a binary treatment. The outcome is the standardized support item, so effects are in standard deviations. Estimated on the full sample; respondents missing the outcome, the treatment or any covariate are dropped before fitting, which is why these samples are slightly smaller than those in the weighted least squares tables. Confidence intervals are normal-approximation intervals from the reported standard errors.

C Correlates of support

C.1 Estimation details

The main text describes the estimators used for the correlates analysis; this section states them formally and defines the units in which coefficients are reported.

For the binary outcome, an indicator Y_i for whether respondent i prefers integration, we fit a weighted logistic regression

$$\Pr(Y_i = 1 \mid \mathbf{X}_i) = \text{logit}^{-1}(\alpha + \mathbf{X}_i^\top \theta), \quad (1)$$

by weighted maximum likelihood, with post-stratification weights normalized to mean~1 in the estimation sample and HC1 robust standard errors. We report each covariate’s average marginal effect on the probability scale, multiplied by 100 and read as a percentage-point change in support, with standard errors derived from the HC1 covariance matrix of the underlying logit.

The change Δ_x underlying each marginal effect depends on how the covariate is scaled, and is stated in the row labels of the tables. Binary and categorical covariates move from the reference category to the comparison category. Income, age and sociotropic economic concern are standardized, so their coefficients are per standard deviation. The education index is the one exception: it enters on its raw four-point ordinal scale, so its coefficient is per category rather than per standard deviation.

For support within a single treatment arm a we estimate

$$Y_i^{(a)} = \alpha^{(a)} + \sum_k \pi_k^{(a)} M_{ik} + \varepsilon_i^{(a)}, \quad (2)$$

on respondents assigned to that arm only, by weighted least squares with the same weights and HC1 standard errors. The outcome is standardized on the *pooled* sample rather than within the arm, so $\pi_k^{(a)}$ is in pooled standard deviations and converting it to the underlying five-point scale requires the pooled standard deviation of that item, not the arm-specific one reported in the table. These estimates are descriptive: they compare respondents within an arm rather than arms with one another, and we do not read them as treatment-effect heterogeneity, which is reported separately in Table 12.

C.2 Heterogeneous treatment effects

The main analysis reports average treatment effects for both experiments and, separately, the correlates of support for integration. It does not report treatment-effect heterogeneity. The pre-analysis plan anticipated that the experimental effects would vary across the same characteristics, so this section tests that directly.

Each row is a separate model of the form $Y_i = \alpha + \sum_j \beta_j T_{ij} + \delta M_i + \sum_j \gamma_j (T_{ij} \times M_i) + \varepsilon_i$, where M_i is the moderator named in the row. Reported coefficients are the interaction terms γ_j : the amount by which that arm’s effect differs for respondents one unit higher on the moderator. All models use post-stratification weights and HC1 robust standard errors, and each panel uses the same reference arm and outcome as the corresponding panel of the main analysis, so the interactions are heterogeneity around the average effects reported there.

These models use the full sample, because camp county and the kinship variables are too thin without the oversamples – 78 camp-county respondents in the nationally representative subsample against 894 here. Randomization holds within the oversampled counties, so this shifts the population described rather than introducing bias, but since the main-text averages are estimated on the nationally representative sample, these are heterogeneity in the same experiments rather than a decomposition of them. The interaction estimates quoted in the main text are the full-sample ones reported here; the same interactions estimated on the nationally representative sample alone are larger in magnitude but roughly twice as imprecise, and the main text notes both.

Table 12: Heterogeneous treatment effects (full sample)

Panel A. Policy experiment: support for the policy shown (SD)		
	Work rights × Mod.	Free movement × Mod.
<i>Economic concerns</i>		
Education (1 category)	-0.093 (0.067)	-0.029 (0.073)
Income (1 SD)	0.032 (0.065)	-0.093 (0.066)
Unemployment	-0.086 (0.126)	-0.061 (0.136)
Formal employment	-0.131 (0.137)	-0.387** (0.141)
Informal employment	0.218 ⁺ (0.121)	0.316* (0.128)
Urban	0.043 (0.123)	-0.058 (0.134)
Agricultural occupation	-0.024 (0.172)	0.200 (0.168)
Socio. econ. concern (1 SD)	0.039 (0.047)	-0.079 ⁺ (0.047)
<i>Ethnic kinship and contact</i>		
Kenyan Somali	0.144 (0.157)	0.316 ⁺ (0.171)
Close contact	0.076 (0.121)	0.092 (0.132)
Camp county	-0.110 (0.111)	0.094 (0.118)
<i>Controls</i>		
Age (1 SD)	-0.027 (0.055)	-0.080 (0.059)
Gender (Female = 1)	0.069 (0.115)	0.044 (0.123)
Observations	2,482	

Panel B. Nationality experiment: support for integration (SD)		
	Somali × Mod.	S. Sudanese × Mod.
<i>Economic concerns</i>		
Education (1 category)	-0.061 (0.059)	-0.012 (0.058)
Income (1 SD)	-0.052 (0.053)	-0.018 (0.053)
Unemployment	-0.023 (0.107)	0.108 (0.114)
Formal employment	-0.021 (0.124)	-0.170 (0.124)
Informal employment	-0.050 (0.104)	-0.084 (0.106)
Urban	-0.035 (0.109)	-0.091 (0.109)
Agricultural occupation	0.107 (0.132)	0.263 ⁺ (0.138)
Socio. econ. concern (1 SD)	0.061 (0.050)	0.044 (0.052)
<i>Ethnic kinship and contact</i>		
Kenyan Somali	0.605*** (0.149)	-0.045 (0.156)
Close contact	-0.058 (0.112)	-0.263* (0.110)
Camp county	0.129 (0.107)	-0.180 ⁺ (0.108)
<i>Controls</i>		
Age (1 SD)	0.145** (0.049)	0.099* (0.050)
Gender (Female = 1)	-0.069 (0.101)	-0.251* (0.103)
Observations	3,294	

Panel C. Nationality experiment: support for hosting in Kenya (SD)		
	Somali × Mod.	S. Sudanese × Mod.
<i>Economic concerns</i>		
Education (1 category)	-0.133* (0.061)	-0.077 (0.058)
Income (1 SD)	-0.089 (0.055)	-0.073 (0.054)
Unemployment	0.307** (0.116)	0.230* (0.113)
Formal employment	-0.287* (0.120)	-0.107 (0.118)
Informal employment	-0.212* (0.106)	-0.185 ⁺ (0.104)
Urban	0.186 (0.113)	-0.106 (0.107)
Agricultural occupation	0.009 (0.140)	0.131 (0.139)
Socio. econ. concern (1 SD)	0.006 (0.048)	0.077 (0.048)
<i>Ethnic kinship and contact</i>		
Kenyan Somali	0.748*** (0.106)	0.003 (0.131)
Close contact	-0.074 (0.112)	-0.207* (0.105)
Camp county	0.074 (0.104)	-0.122 (0.099)
<i>Controls</i>		
Age (1 SD)	0.061 (0.050)	0.079 (0.049)
Gender (Female = 1)	-0.069 (0.103)	-0.274** (0.101)
Observations	3,269	

Notes: Each cell is an interaction coefficient from a separate weighted least squares model of the outcome on the two arm indicators, the moderator, and their interactions, estimated on the full sample with post-stratification weights and HC1 robust standard errors in parentheses. A positive coefficient means that arm's effect is larger for respondents higher on the moderator. Reference arms are integrated settlements in Panel A and the generic *refugees* wording in Panels B and C, matching the main analysis. The full sample is used, rather than the nationally representative subsample, because camp county is one of the moderators and identifies only 78 nationally representative respondents against 894 here. All respondents are retained, including those who fail the comprehension check and those already aware of the Shirika Plan, as in the main analysis. Outcomes are standardized. Moderators are entered one at a time rather than jointly, so the coefficients are not mutually adjusted; with thirteen moderators and two interactions each, a single saturated model would rest on very few observations per cell. Observations are the largest estimation sample in each panel; rows vary slightly where a moderator is missing. These are exploratory tests of pre-specified moderators and are not corrected for multiple comparisons. *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, + $p < 0.10$.

C.3 Robustness checks

Every table in this section re-estimates the correlates of support analysis on two outcomes: *preference for integration*, the binary indicator from the five-option policy menu (weighted logit, average marginal effects in percentage points, full sample), and *support for hosting refugees in Kenya* (weighted OLS in standard deviations, estimated in the generic *refugees* arm of the nationality experiment). These are columns 1 and 5 of the main correlates table in the paper. The three policy-arm columns of that table are not reproduced here. The covariate set is the same as reported in the main table.

C.3.1 Alternative specifications

We vary the estimator while holding the sample and the covariate set fixed. For preference for integration the weighted logit is re-estimated as a linear probability model and, separately, without weights. For support for hosting, whose main estimate is already OLS, the estimator variation is the reverse: the outcome is dichotomised and re-estimated as a logit. In the *Unadjusted* column, each covariate is entered in a model of its own, so every cell is a raw bivariate association with no other characteristic held constant.

The kinship and contact associations are unchanged throughout. The only column that moves is the unadjusted one, which we report for completeness but do not interpret, since each cell absorbs everything correlated with that characteristic. *Camp county* is the clearest case: it reverses sign, because residents of Turkana and Garissa are disproportionately Kenyan Somali and more likely to report close contact, so its unadjusted coefficient is largely picking up those two variables.

Table 13: Robustness: alternative specifications

	Main	Linear / binary	Unadjusted	Unweighted
<i>Panel A. Preference for integration (percentage points)</i>				
Economic concerns				
Education (1 category)	3.72** (1.35)	3.72** (1.32)	5.74*** (1.14)	2.85* (1.14)
Income (1 SD)	1.85 (1.23)	1.83 (1.21)	3.64*** (1.05)	1.68 (1.06)
Unemployment	-0.79 (3.32)	-0.86 (3.25)	-0.89 (2.24)	-1.83 (2.84)
Formal employment	1.65 (3.74)	1.49 (3.66)	3.12 (2.48)	-0.55 (3.15)
Informal employment	0.28 (3.48)	0.14 (3.38)	-4.02 ⁺ (2.12)	-2.28 (2.96)
Urban	2.90 (2.44)	2.87 (2.41)	6.65** (2.22)	4.56* (2.06)
Agricultural occupation	0.12 (3.28)	0.10 (3.22)	-9.67*** (2.74)	-0.68 (2.88)
Socio. econ. concern (1 SD)	-2.70* (1.09)	-2.66* (1.07)	-4.02*** (1.02)	-2.20* (0.94)
Ethnic kinship and contact				
Kenyan Somali	21.08*** (3.72)	21.24*** (3.87)	21.90*** (3.04)	20.39*** (3.24)
Close contact	6.96** (2.50)	6.98** (2.49)	9.92*** (2.31)	6.07** (2.14)
Camp county	-3.59 (2.62)	-3.59 (2.61)	7.06** (2.16)	-2.86 (2.41)
Controls				
Age (1 SD)	-5.71*** (1.18)	-5.62*** (1.16)	-7.64*** (0.99)	-5.72*** (1.01)
Gender (Female = 1)	6.20** (2.23)	6.07** (2.21)	3.27 (2.05)	7.46*** (1.91)
Observations	2,922	2,922	3,268	2,922
<i>Panel B. Support for hosting in Kenya (standard deviations)</i>				
Economic concerns				
Education (1 category)	0.12** (0.04)	6.65*** (1.78)	0.15*** (0.04)	0.13*** (0.04)
Income (1 SD)	0.07 ⁺ (0.04)	4.01* (1.78)	0.16*** (0.04)	0.06* (0.03)
Unemployment	-0.13 (0.11)	-6.50 (5.56)	-0.18* (0.08)	-0.13 (0.08)
Formal employment	-0.01 (0.13)	-2.13 (6.12)	0.19* (0.08)	-0.06 (0.09)
Informal employment	0.02 (0.12)	-0.46 (5.42)	0.00 (0.07)	-0.08 (0.09)
Urban	-0.01 (0.07)	-0.25 (3.29)	0.05 (0.08)	-0.04 (0.06)
Agricultural occupation	0.02 (0.11)	1.50 (4.03)	-0.21* (0.10)	0.02 (0.09)
Socio. econ. concern (1 SD)	-0.07* (0.03)	-3.59* (1.59)	-0.14*** (0.03)	-0.08** (0.02)
Ethnic kinship and contact				
Kenyan Somali	0.51*** (0.10)	16.33*** (3.14)	0.59*** (0.08)	0.44*** (0.09)
Close contact	0.25*** (0.07)	9.29** (3.08)	0.38*** (0.07)	0.19** (0.06)
Camp county	0.11 (0.08)	3.88 (3.37)	0.44*** (0.07)	0.13 ⁺ (0.07)
Controls				
Age (1 SD)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.37 (1.60)	-0.11*** (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)
Gender (Female = 1)	0.12 (0.07)	7.52* (3.04)	-0.01 (0.07)	0.09 (0.06)
Observations	974	974	1,083	974

Notes: Preference for integration is estimated by weighted logit on the full sample and reported as average marginal effects in percentage points. Support for hosting in Kenya is estimated by weighted OLS in standard deviations, in the generic (*refugees*) arm of the nationality experiment. Units differ between panels, so the two are not comparable with one another. HC1 standard errors in parentheses. The estimator just described is the *Main* column; the other three columns vary it, as their headings indicate. The *Linear / binary* column reports a linear probability model in Panel A and, in Panel B, average marginal effects in percentage points from a logit on the dichotomised hosting item, so that panel's units are percentage points in that column alone. The *Unadjusted* column enters each covariate on its own, so its cells are bivariate weighted associations and its N is the largest estimation sample across those models. *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, ⁺ $p < 0.10$.

C.3.2 Alternative samples

We re-estimate on the nationally representative subsample alone, dropping the Turkana and Garissa over-samples; excluding respondents who reported prior awareness of the Shirika Plan; and excluding respondents who failed the post-treatment comprehension check. For support for hosting we add a column that pools all three arms of the nationality experiment with arm fixed effects rather than restricting to the generic arm.

Kinship and contact survive every restriction. Interpret *Camp county* with caution in the *NatRep only* column, since it rests on the 78 camp-county respondents in the nationally representative sample rather than the 894 in the full sample.

Table 14: Robustness: alternative samples

	Main	NatRep only	Excl. Shirika-aware	Excl. failed check	All arms + arm FE
<i>Panel A. Preference for integration (percentage points)</i>					
Economic concerns					
Education (1 category)	3.72** (1.35)	3.84* (1.69)	4.17** (1.34)	4.26** (1.38)	—
Income (1 SD)	1.85 (1.23)	4.13** (1.54)	1.56 (1.22)	1.81 (1.26)	—
Unemployment	-0.79 (3.32)	-4.37 (4.04)	-1.30 (3.33)	-2.96 (3.41)	—
Formal employment	1.65 (3.74)	1.16 (4.48)	1.25 (3.76)	0.22 (3.88)	—
Informal employment	0.28 (3.48)	-1.78 (4.15)	0.09 (3.51)	-1.22 (3.62)	—
Urban	2.90 (2.44)	2.29 (2.86)	3.41 (2.45)	3.10 (2.54)	—
Agricultural occupation	0.12 (3.28)	-0.48 (3.50)	-0.33 (3.33)	-0.02 (3.46)	—
Socio. econ. concern (1 SD)	-2.70* (1.09)	-2.22 (1.35)	-2.95** (1.10)	-3.15** (1.13)	—
Ethnic kinship and contact					
Kenyan Somali	21.08*** (3.72)	15.92* (7.55)	20.92*** (3.78)	20.27*** (3.85)	—
Close contact	6.96** (2.50)	7.64* (3.11)	6.93** (2.53)	6.09* (2.56)	—
Camp county	-3.59 (2.62)	-15.93* (7.07)	-3.04 (2.65)	-4.03 (2.71)	—
Controls					
Age (1 SD)	-5.71*** (1.18)	-6.36*** (1.36)	-5.50*** (1.19)	-6.29*** (1.20)	—
Gender (Female = 1)	6.20** (2.23)	5.13* (2.61)	6.57** (2.25)	6.34** (2.31)	—
Observations	2,922	2,206	2,873	2,691	—
<i>Panel B. Support for hosting in Kenya (standard deviations)</i>					
Economic concerns					
Education (1 category)	0.12** (0.04)	0.13* (0.06)	0.12** (0.04)	0.10* (0.04)	0.05+ (0.03)
Income (1 SD)	0.07+ (0.04)	0.06 (0.05)	0.07+ (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	0.04+ (0.02)
Unemployment	-0.13 (0.11)	-0.17 (0.14)	-0.14 (0.11)	-0.08 (0.12)	-0.05 (0.06)
Formal employment	-0.01 (0.13)	0.03 (0.16)	0.00 (0.13)	0.02 (0.14)	-0.06 (0.07)
Informal employment	0.02 (0.12)	0.03 (0.14)	0.01 (0.12)	0.07 (0.12)	-0.13* (0.07)
Urban	-0.01 (0.07)	0.06 (0.09)	-0.01 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.04)
Agricultural occupation	0.02 (0.11)	0.03 (0.12)	0.03 (0.11)	-0.01 (0.11)	0.09 (0.06)
Socio. econ. concern (1 SD)	-0.07* (0.03)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.07* (0.03)	-0.09** (0.03)	-0.05* (0.02)
Ethnic kinship and contact					
Kenyan Somali	0.51*** (0.10)	0.75*** (0.15)	0.53*** (0.10)	0.51*** (0.10)	0.79*** (0.06)
Close contact	0.25*** (0.07)	0.24** (0.09)	0.27*** (0.07)	0.26*** (0.07)	0.23*** (0.05)
Camp county	0.11 (0.08)	0.15 (0.19)	0.10 (0.08)	0.08 (0.08)	0.05 (0.05)
Controls					
Age (1 SD)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.06+ (0.04)	-0.02 (0.02)
Gender (Female = 1)	0.12 (0.07)	0.10 (0.09)	0.11 (0.07)	0.11 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.04)
Observations	974	722	961	896	2,925

Notes: Preference for integration is estimated by weighted logit on the full sample and reported as average marginal effects in percentage points. Support for hosting in Kenya is estimated by weighted OLS in standard deviations, in the generic (*refugees*) arm of the nationality experiment. Units differ between panels, so the two are not comparable with one another. HC1 standard errors in parentheses. The final column applies only to Panel B: it pools the three arms of the nationality experiment and absorbs the arm with fixed effects, rather than restricting to the generic wording. Panel A is estimated on every arm already, because the policy menu is asked of all respondents. *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, + $p < 0.10$.

C.3.3 Alternative measures

In this section, we test alternative measures of the variables of interest. Each column changes one construct and leaves the rest of the specification alone.

Refugee presence is the respondent's own report of how many refugees live in their county, which substitutes self-report for camp geography. *Camp location* is residence in a camp-hosting constituency – Turkana West, Dadaab and Fafi – a geographically far more precise measure of proximity than *Camp county*, but one that identifies only 150 respondents in the full sample and 19 in the nationally representative subsample, so it is estimated much less precisely and is reported on the full sample only. *Population density* replaces the binary urban indicator with a continuous measure. *Cost-of-living concern* is a second sociotropic economic measure, substituted for perceived change in the national economy. *Kenyan Nilotic* is a second kinship measure, linking several Kenyan communities to South Sudanese refugees, though it isn't shared kinship (as with Kenyan Somalis) but instead a broader ethnolinguistic similarity.

Kinship and contact are unaffected by all of them. Two substantive results: self-reported refugee presence is positively associated with preference for integration, so the null on *Camp county* is not evidence that proximity is irrelevant; and *Kenyan Nilotic* is indistinguishable from zero on both outcomes, so the kinship result is specific to Kenyan Somali respondents rather than general to being from a similar ethnolinguistic group with a refugee population.

Table 15: Robustness: alternative measures, preference for integration

	Main	Refugee presence	Camp location	Population density	Cost-of-living concern	Kenyan Nilotic	PAP covariates
<i>Weighted logit, average marginal effects in percentage points, full sample</i>							
Economic concerns							
Education (1 category)	3.72** (1.35)	3.04* (1.48)	3.56** (1.38)	3.78** (1.34)	3.73** (1.35)	3.71** (1.35)	3.36* (1.37)
Income (1 SD)	1.85 (1.23)	1.18 (1.35)	1.93 (1.24)	1.91 (1.23)	2.29+ (1.23)	1.85 (1.23)	2.04 (1.24)
Unemployment	-0.79 (3.32)	-2.34 (3.63)	-1.02 (3.33)	-0.73 (3.32)	-0.68 (3.33)	-0.79 (3.32)	-0.36 (3.34)
Formal employment	1.65 (3.74)	0.69 (4.10)	1.57 (3.75)	1.73 (3.74)	1.63 (3.76)	1.67 (3.74)	2.08 (3.76)
Informal employment	0.28 (3.48)	-0.49 (3.78)	0.32 (3.49)	0.40 (3.47)	0.40 (3.49)	0.31 (3.48)	0.92 (3.52)
Urban	2.90 (2.44)	2.73 (2.64)	3.64 (2.44)	—	2.14 (2.44)	3.02 (2.48)	2.76 (2.44)
Population density (1 SD)	—	—	—	0.95 (1.13)	—	—	—
Agricultural occupation	0.12 (3.28)	2.13 (3.43)	0.90 (3.23)	-0.14 (3.26)	0.33 (3.27)	0.12 (3.28)	-0.10 (3.29)
Socio. econ. concern (1 SD)	-2.70* (1.09)	-2.81* (1.15)	-2.72* (1.08)	-2.68* (1.09)	—	-2.69* (1.09)	-2.62* (1.09)
Cost-of-living concern (1 SD)	—	—	—	—	-0.37 (1.07)	—	—
Ethnic kinship and contact							
Kenyan Somali	21.08*** (3.72)	19.91*** (3.47)	18.80*** (3.47)	21.71*** (3.64)	22.90*** (3.55)	21.43*** (4.01)	19.69*** (5.60)
Kenyan Nilotic	—	—	—	—	—	0.67 (2.48)	—
Close contact	6.96** (2.50)	6.00* (2.64)	6.27* (2.52)	6.81** (2.50)	6.94** (2.50)	6.95** (2.51)	7.01** (2.52)
Camp county	-3.59 (2.62)	—	—	-3.63 (2.62)	-3.96 (2.62)	-3.82 (2.78)	-3.67 (2.63)
Camp location	—	—	3.20 (4.91)	—	—	—	—
Refugee presence (county)	—	5.22* (2.38)	—	—	—	—	—
Controls							
Age (1 SD)	-5.71*** (1.18)	-4.81*** (1.28)	-5.67*** (1.19)	-5.67*** (1.18)	-5.78*** (1.18)	-5.67*** (1.19)	-5.15*** (1.27)
Gender (Female = 1)	6.20** (2.23)	4.35+ (2.40)	6.56** (2.22)	6.30** (2.23)	6.47** (2.22)	6.22** (2.23)	6.12** (2.24)
Christian	—	—	—	—	—	—	7.13 (4.87)
Islam	—	—	—	—	—	—	8.41 (6.77)
Prev. displaced	—	—	—	—	—	—	-2.27 (3.32)
Marital (single)	—	—	—	—	—	—	3.98 (2.71)
Observations	2,922	2,496	2,922	2,922	2,927	2,922	2,914

Notes:

HC1 standard errors in parentheses. Each column replaces or adds one construct and leaves the rest of the specification unchanged; an em-dash marks a variable absent from that column's model. *Refugee presence* is coded from the county-level self-report as the survey codebook specifies (very many, many or few versus none, with don't-know set missing), which is why its N is lower. *Camp location* is reported on the full sample only: it identifies 19 respondents in the nationally representative subsample. The *PAP covariates* column adds religion, prior displacement and marital status, the pre-analysis plan's remaining covariates. *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, + $p < 0.10$.

Table 16: Robustness: alternative measures, support for hosting in Kenya

	Main	Refugee presence	Camp location	Population density	Cost-of-living concern	Kenyan Nilotic	PAP covariates
<i>Weighted OLS, standard deviations, generic nationality arm</i>							
Economic concerns							
Education (1 category)	0.12** (0.04)	0.16** (0.05)	0.13** (0.04)	0.12** (0.04)	0.12** (0.04)	0.12** (0.04)	0.11* (0.04)
Income (1 SD)	0.07+ (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.07+ (0.04)	0.07+ (0.04)	0.09* (0.04)	0.07+ (0.04)	0.08+ (0.04)
Unemployment	-0.13 (0.11)	-0.05 (0.13)	-0.13 (0.11)	-0.13 (0.11)	-0.10 (0.12)	-0.13 (0.11)	-0.12 (0.11)
Formal employment	-0.01 (0.13)	0.08 (0.15)	-0.01 (0.13)	-0.01 (0.13)	0.02 (0.13)	-0.00 (0.13)	0.01 (0.13)
Informal employment	0.02 (0.12)	0.12 (0.13)	0.02 (0.12)	0.02 (0.12)	0.06 (0.12)	0.02 (0.12)	0.04 (0.12)
Urban	-0.01 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.08)	-0.01 (0.07)	—	-0.05 (0.07)	0.01 (0.07)	-0.00 (0.07)
Population density (1 SD)	—	—	—	-0.04 (0.03)	—	—	—
Agricultural occupation	0.02 (0.11)	-0.07 (0.11)	0.01 (0.11)	0.01 (0.11)	0.06 (0.11)	0.02 (0.11)	0.02 (0.11)
Socio. econ. concern (1 SD)	-0.07* (0.03)	-0.09** (0.03)	-0.07* (0.03)	-0.07* (0.03)	—	-0.07* (0.03)	-0.07* (0.03)
Cost-of-living concern (1 SD)	—	—	—	—	0.03 (0.03)	—	—
Ethnic kinship and contact							
Kenyan Somali	0.51*** (0.10)	0.63*** (0.10)	0.57*** (0.09)	0.51*** (0.09)	0.53*** (0.10)	0.55*** (0.11)	0.53** (0.18)
Kenyan Nilotic	—	—	—	—	—	0.08 (0.09)	—
Close contact	0.25*** (0.07)	0.28*** (0.07)	0.27*** (0.07)	0.26*** (0.07)	0.24*** (0.07)	0.25*** (0.07)	0.26*** (0.07)
Camp county	0.11 (0.08)	—	—	0.09 (0.08)	0.16* (0.08)	0.08 (0.08)	0.11 (0.08)
Camp location	—	—	0.06 (0.12)	—	—	—	—
Refugee presence (county)	—	-0.03 (0.08)	—	—	—	—	—
Controls							
Age (1 SD)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.07+ (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)
Gender (Female = 1)	0.12 (0.07)	0.09 (0.08)	0.11 (0.07)	0.12 (0.07)	0.15* (0.07)	0.11 (0.07)	0.12+ (0.07)
Christian	—	—	—	—	—	—	-0.03 (0.16)
Islam	—	—	—	—	—	—	-0.04 (0.22)
Prev. displaced	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.06 (0.10)
Marital (single)	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.12 (0.09)
Observations	974	826	974	974	977	974	973

Notes:

HC1 standard errors in parentheses. Each column replaces or adds one construct and leaves the rest of the specification unchanged; an em-dash marks a variable absent from that column's model. *Refugee presence* is coded from the county-level self-report as the survey codebook specifies (very many, many or few versus none, with don't-know set missing), which is why its N is lower. *Camp location* is reported on the full sample only: it identifies 19 respondents in the nationally representative subsample. The *PAP covariates* column adds religion, prior displacement and marital status, the pre-analysis plan's remaining covariates. *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, + $p < 0.10$.

C.3.4 Alternative outcomes

We replicate the analysis on two further measures of attitudes towards refugees: a ten-point feeling thermometer towards refugees in Kenya, and a four-point item asking how concerned the respondent is about hosting refugees as an issue facing the country. Both are asked before either experiment, so responses pool across arms, and both are estimated on the full sample.

Neither column reproduces the main pattern, and the divergence is concentrated in the kinship and contact

rows. Kenyan Somali respondents are markedly more likely to prefer integration and to support hosting, yet rate refugees about a point lower on the thermometer (4.9 against 5.9) and report *more* concern about hosting as a national issue. Respondents reporting close contact also report more concern, without rating refugees any colder. This is not a proximity effect: residents of camp-hosting counties rate refugees *warmer* and report *less* concern, so whatever produces the Kenyan Somali pattern is specific to that group rather than to living near refugees.

We suggest that the concern item measures salience rather than opposition. The question does not separate concern about refugee hosting as a burden from concern for refugees themselves, and it is the respondents closest to the issue, whether by kinship or by contact, who are most likely to say it concerns them. The negative association between Kenyan Somali identity and thermometer warmth we cannot account for, and we flag it for future investigation. What the table does establish is that these are distinct constructs: both outcomes correlate only weakly with preference for integration ($r = 0.06$ and $r = -0.06$) and only modestly with each other ($r = -0.19$).

Table 17: Robustness: alternative outcomes

	Feeling thermometer	Concern re hosting
<i>Weighted OLS, standard deviations, full sample</i>		
Economic concerns		
Education (1 category)	-0.00 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)
Income (1 SD)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)
Unemployment	-0.02 (0.08)	0.08 (0.07)
Formal employment	-0.04 (0.08)	0.06 (0.08)
Informal employment	-0.04 (0.08)	-0.07 (0.07)
Urban	0.01 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)
Agricultural occupation	0.05 (0.07)	-0.04 (0.07)
Socio. econ. concern (1 SD)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)
Ethnic kinship and contact		
Kenyan Somali	-0.31*** (0.09)	0.30*** (0.08)
Close contact	0.09 (0.05)	0.15** (0.05)
Camp county	0.13* (0.06)	-0.21*** (0.05)
Controls		
Age (1 SD)	0.00 (0.03)	0.08** (0.02)
Gender (Female = 1)	-0.07 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)
Observations	2,842	2,916

Notes:

HC1 standard errors in parentheses. Neither column is the preference-for-integration outcome used elsewhere in this appendix: both are estimated by weighted OLS and reported in standard deviations, so they are not comparable with the percentage-point estimates in the other robustness tables. Both outcomes are standardised on the pooled sample. The thermometer runs from 1 (very negative) to 10 (very positive), so a positive coefficient is a warmer rating. Concern about hosting is reversed so that a positive coefficient is MORE concern; it is therefore expected to carry the opposite sign to the other outcomes in this appendix. *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, + $p < 0.10$.

C.3.5 Functional form

We relax the linearity assumption for the continuous and binned covariates – education, income, age and sociotropic economic concern – by adding a squared term for each and refitting.

Kinship and contact are unmoved. Sociotropic economic concern loses significance on both outcomes, and on preference for integration it changes sign.

Table 18: Robustness: relaxing the linearity assumption

	Main	Polynomial
<i>Panel A. Preference for integration (percentage points)</i>		
Economic concerns		
Education (1 category)	3.72** (1.35)	12.09 (8.24)
Income (1 SD)	1.85 (1.23)	1.98 (1.26)
Unemployment	-0.79 (3.32)	-1.22 (3.46)
Formal employment	1.65 (3.74)	1.35 (3.92)
Informal employment	0.28 (3.48)	-0.35 (3.73)
Urban	2.90 (2.44)	2.56 (2.45)
Agricultural occupation	0.12 (3.28)	-0.21 (3.28)
Socio. econ. concern (1 SD)	-2.70* (1.09)	0.85 (2.26)
Ethnic kinship and contact		
Kenyan Somali	21.08*** (3.72)	21.15*** (3.78)
Close contact	6.96** (2.50)	7.00** (2.49)
Camp county	-3.59 (2.62)	-3.62 (2.65)
Controls		
Age (1 SD)	-5.71*** (1.18)	-5.63*** (1.47)
Gender (Female = 1)	6.20** (2.23)	6.17** (2.25)
Observations	2,922	2,922
<i>Panel B. Support for hosting in Kenya (standard deviations)</i>		
Economic concerns		
Education (1 category)	0.12** (0.04)	0.40+ (0.24)
Income (1 SD)	0.07+ (0.04)	0.08* (0.04)
Unemployment	-0.13 (0.11)	-0.12 (0.11)
Formal employment	-0.01 (0.13)	0.03 (0.14)
Informal employment	0.02 (0.12)	0.03 (0.12)
Urban	-0.01 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.07)
Agricultural occupation	0.02 (0.11)	0.01 (0.10)
Socio. econ. concern (1 SD)	-0.07* (0.03)	0.01 (0.07)
Ethnic kinship and contact		
Kenyan Somali	0.51*** (0.10)	0.52*** (0.10)
Close contact	0.25*** (0.07)	0.26*** (0.07)
Camp county	0.11 (0.08)	0.13+ (0.08)
Controls		
Age (1 SD)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.10* (0.04)
Gender (Female = 1)	0.12 (0.07)	0.13+ (0.07)
Observations	974	974

Notes: Preference for integration is estimated by weighted logit on the full sample and reported as average marginal effects in percentage points. Support for hosting in Kenya is estimated by weighted OLS in standard deviations, in the generic (*refugees*) arm of the nationality experiment. Units differ between panels, so the two are not comparable with one another. HC1 standard errors in parentheses. The polynomial column adds squared terms for education, income, age and sociotropic economic concern. Average marginal effects in Panel A average over both terms, so the reported cell is the total marginal effect and not the linear coefficient alone. Squared terms are estimated but not shown. *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, + $p < 0.10$.

C.4 Province and ethnicity analysis

Tables 19 and 20 show weighted mean support for refugee integration by province and ethnic group. The estimates use the full sample, including the Turkana and Garissa oversamples, and include ethnic groups with at least 100 respondents.

Support varies considerably across regions. It is highest in North Eastern Province (59.6 percent), which includes Dadaab and has a large Kenyan Somali population, and lowest in Eastern (36.1 percent), Coast (36.8 percent), and Western (40.9 percent). Nairobi (50.8 percent) and Central (50.5 percent) also show relatively high support. This suggests that proximity to refugee camps is not enough to explain the regional pattern: Rift Valley, which includes Kakuma, is closer to the middle of the distribution at 42.4 percent.

The ethnic-group results show that Somali respondents report the highest support (64.1 percent), consistent with the kinship result in the main analysis. Turkana respondents, who also live near a major refugee camp

but do not share ethnicity with the largest refugee groups, are much closer to the full-sample average of 45.4 percent, at 41.8 percent. In these descriptive comparisons, ethnic ties appear to track support more closely than geography alone.

Table 19: Percent support, by province (full sample)

	Observational	Policy experiment			Nationality experiment		
	Obs	Work	Move	Settlements	Refugees	Somalia	South Sudan
n	3,268	817	836	829	1,084	1,109	1,101
Coast	36.8	59.7	51.2	72.5	41.0	16.1	47.5
Western	40.9	68.4	46.6	78.6	51.3	18.4	35.3
Eastern	36.1	75.7	57.0	65.3	35.5	16.6	35.7
Rift Valley	42.4	74.5	68.6	76.4	55.5	26.6	45.4
Central	50.5	62.7	66.0	71.6	55.2	25.3	39.7
Nyanza	42.6	65.5	64.0	70.2	50.5	27.9	49.6
Nairobi	50.8	60.8	50.1	77.6	46.4	24.6	36.9
North Eastern	59.6	83.6	78.2	81.3	64.2	55.6	51.7

Notes: Cells are weighted percentages, using post-stratification weights, on the full sample (national sample plus the Turkana and Garissa oversamples). The *Observational* column is the share choosing full rights from the five-option policy menu, which is asked of every respondent. The experiment columns are the share rating the item 4 or 5 on the five-point support scale, within each arm; *Settlements* is the integrated-settlements arm of the policy experiment and *Refugees* is the generic wording of the nationality experiment, not a control arm. The row of *n* at the top gives the number of respondents behind each column; group sizes vary, so cells in the smaller rows rest on few respondents and should not be read as precise. These are descriptive levels, not treatment contrasts.

Table 20: Percent support, by ethnic group (full sample)

	Observational	Policy experiment			Nationality experiment		
	Obs	Work	Move	Settlements	Refugees	Somalia	South Sudan
n	2,984	754	749	754	982	1,011	1,015
Kikuyu	48.6	69.0	61.6	69.9	52.1	18.7	45.0
Somali	64.1	87.2	84.6	83.2	65.4	66.0	55.6
Turkana	41.8	76.4	78.5	85.3	56.4	34.6	42.2
Luhya	38.4	67.3	48.6	79.1	53.3	17.3	34.2
Luo	45.2	71.4	64.2	69.7	53.7	25.9	55.8
Kalenjin	47.7	73.4	68.2	79.8	63.4	19.8	54.4
Kamba	37.8	70.5	54.0	53.1	38.1	16.9	29.7
Kisii	51.3	69.6	60.1	68.0	53.8	29.0	45.4
Meru	41.8	69.1	65.0	79.2	50.4	13.5	42.7
Mijikenda	36.8	56.1	48.1	85.4	34.8	17.5	45.6

Notes: Cells are weighted percentages, using post-stratification weights, on the full sample (national sample plus the Turkana and Garissa oversamples). The *Observational* column is the share choosing full rights from the five-option policy menu, which is asked of every respondent. The experiment columns are the share rating the item 4 or 5 on the five-point support scale, within each arm; *Settlements* is the integrated-settlements arm of the policy experiment and *Refugees* is the generic wording of the nationality experiment, not a control arm. The row of *n* at the top gives the number of respondents behind each column; group sizes vary, so cells in the smaller rows rest on few respondents and should not be read as precise. These are descriptive levels, not treatment contrasts.

D Open-ended questions

D.1 Coding

Two research assistants hand-coded based on the coding scheme that was devised through reviewing and categorizing 10 percent of the sample's responses. We then checked all responses for errors and consistency. Respondents could state more than one type of impact in their response.

- **Security (all except terrorism):** crime, guns, drugs, wars, violence, arms, harm, hurt, conflict, general insecurity, chaos, instability, other
- **Security (terrorism):** terrorism, terrorists, Westgate attacks, Al Shabaab
- **Economy NEGATIVE:** businesses, employment, jobs, taxes, corruption, resources, cost of living, access to services, housing, dependency, healthcare, school, Kenyans should be given NGO support instead of refugees
- **Cultural NEGATIVE:** morals, cultural/tribal/ethnic differences, changes to culture, trust, politics and voting
- **Reputation/Reciprocity NEGATIVE:** relationships with other countries, enemy countries
- **Population growth:** Concern about refugee population growing, not returning home, people should stay in their country
- **Fear:** not sure whether people are coming illegally, worry that they don't know what their intentions are, whether they will be bad people
- **Economy POSITIVE:** businesses, employment, jobs, taxes, trade, work, resources, access to services, NGOs, housing, healthcare, school
- **Cultural POSITIVE:** community, togetherness, unity, similar to Kenyans, grew up and studied here, been here for a while already, friendship, new ideas/innovation
- **Reputation/Reciprocity POSITIVE:** relationships with other countries, reputation (globally or regionally), Kenya may need help in future, diplomacy
- **Humanitarian:** human beings, humanity, people need help, should have rights, deserve sanctuary, right thing to do, they are facing a hard situation, cannot go back, be good neighbors, Kenya is peaceful, they moved due to insecurity
- **Other:** no impact, any other reason not listed here
- **Don't Know:** if someone says they don't know, not audible, unclear, empty box

D.2 Example quotes

Policy Experiment

We asked respondents an open-ended question after each experiment. Below are some examples, grouped by theme and mechanism. Quotations are selected to reflect the relative frequency of the coded themes within each arm, and include both supportive and opposed responses. Some have been lightly edited for spelling and punctuation.

Economic Inclusion

Security - "Security may be compromised but we would have built oneness and peace with the refugee countries." - "It will help refugees improve their lives and will engage them and this will reduce terrorism cases." - "It will be good since if people are helped our country will be safe." - "There will be insecurity and also if they're allowed to use M-PESA services they might con people." - "Increased conflicts between Kenyans and refugees if they will be allowed to work while Kenyans don't have jobs." - "It will bring theft cases because they are coming to look for money." - "The unemployment rate in Kenya is high. If you allow them to come to Kenya who will guarantee our security. Insecurity and cost of living because many Kenyans will not have employment."

Economy - "It will lead to the creation of job opportunities." - "It will give every person an opportunity to work." - "Economic growth because if they are able to work they will be able to pay taxes." - "When they're offered those business licenses, when people are getting employed, the number of people getting jobs is high, it will increase the economy and the government will earn more taxes." - "Increased workforce and stability, boosting the economy and unemployment." - "If the refugees are taken care of and provided with work, they will improve the economy. But if also given too much freedom, they will end up domineering the economic and employment sector." - "If we allow them to enter and start doing business, most of us will lose jobs because most Kenyans do their business with small money and for sure we don't have money. But them, they will come with a lot of money like the Somali you are saying, so they will be the ones to take over here. So it's better we work with the small that we have, we succeed but not the visitors to enter." - "Help in the economy because there is money and they will be able to pay taxes and there will be development like roads because they will need access." - "Competition in the business sector." - "Some Kenyans will not get work because the refugees will be prioritized." - "It will bring talents to Kenyans in work industry." - "It will help them earn something for themselves instead of waiting for relief." - "Refugees will be now in a position to feed themselves so it will reduce dependency." - "The danger will be them coming in large numbers and get jobs while we Kenyans

will lack jobs. They can get opportunities that we don't get." - "It will make people complain why others are given work while we don't have work." - "The locals will be able to gain in their businesses through trading with the refugees." - "They are going to take our businesses and bring fake things like gold and money."

Culture - "It will make refugees live a good life as they will be able to start businesses." - "It will help refugees for they will have something to support themselves." - "I don't see any effects because it's like helping God's children." - "It will improve the name of Kenya and create job opportunities by employing youth." - "It will help us as Kenya and Kenya will be a good role model to others."

Movement Rights

Security - "We already have issues with the resource management. We have seen so many people fighting over resources, water and even land. [Movement rights will mean that refugees] will go where there is reliable rainfall, where there is good transport, where there is facilities... definitely now people will want to fight over resources." - "It will lead to threats and cultural alienation." - "It will cause insecurity, rape cases, and spread of diseases." - "Maybe some have a bad background, maybe they're criminals coming to interfere with the security of Kenya." - "Maybe the refugees can come with bad intentions. There are those who can bring destruction while others will be in real search of peace." - "Refugees number might increase which might results to violence." - "The problem is you can't know whom you're welcoming. Someone comes if in need of help but after staying with them, you see negative things. They can destroy your family, your wife, and you still go out to help them survive. You don't know where they're from and where they're going. Where will you take them?" - "Over population of refugees who will get lands and take over the country." - "I don't think there will be any impact as long as there is law and they are under law, there will be no issues. a criminal will be treated as a criminal so I don't think there will be any issues." - "Some enemies want wealth, cows or camels or goats. Then there are enemies like Alshabab, they don't want wealth, they want the blood of a good person to kill." - "Because the war is going on in Somalia, it will bring war here to us." - "Allowing them to move freely can bring about criminal acts." - "Refugees who came to Kenya most of them don't know Swahili, they are speaking a language we don't understand. So even when they plan to commit crimes you won't know." - "Some can might be bad people who have ran away from their homes or are killers and this can cause insecurity." - "It can bring enmity between us and them because of land issues. There might be so many in one place and people might feel they want to take their lands." - "Will bring thievery and evil in Kenya." - "Someone who comes from another place finds it hard to relate with others. Refugees from Sudan are violent. Even if they play they start war that is sometimes dangerous. So, for me, I see there is danger if there will not be regulations."

Economy - "Will bring a lot of changes helping Kenya to grow, like promoting peace within Kenya. They will be able to concentrate on other things like education and farming without any interruption. This will make the country grow widely in terms of education and farming." - "You know there are some people from maybe Southern Sudan or Somalia or Uganda or anywhere who are good in business so it will improve economy. We will interact with people from different places. Their countries are not safe maybe they come to Kenya and be so many. Maybe we will be able to share food, housing, land and other things." - "The refugees might bring new ideas and lead to country's growth." - "Stiff competition for the scarce resource and job opportunities and there will be security issues." - "The economy will become very hard. There is no money to cater for extra people." - "They will help because most of them will come with different ideas. What they are doing in their home country, like that, they will create something in Kenya to get money which it will be helpful to people living in that neighborhood." - "It will increase the tax because there will be free movement of people from one place to the other and so we may interact and so many things." - "People can share ideas in terms of growth of Kenya, business, economy, planning." - "They will be taking our jobs." - "They will grow the labor force and the economy and might also compromise morals and peace." - "Increased population which will overburden the economy, also can lead to improved economic status since Somalis are vibrant in business." - "It might cause unemployment, land shortages for settlement." - "Kenyan displacement by refugees." - "Negative because of lack of enough space in the country."

Culture - "It will create a good relationship between Kenya and other countries like Sudan and Congo since they have allowed their people to live among Kenyans." - "Refugees will bring their knowledge in Kenya and with interaction we will learn some things from them." - "It will enable them to interact with Kenyans and will lead to assimilation hence population increase." - "They might be bringing good ideas for us to be investing or upgrade ourselves. People will learn to treat others normally. Maybe people should know we're not different to them." - "It will cause language barrier." - "It's okay, people will understand each other through interacting with them." - "More social interactions, integration, cultural diversity, economic diversity." - "Mess up with Kenyan culture since they have their own culture." - "It will bring unity among Kenyans and businesses will grow." - "Because we do not know if refugees have good business intentions or if they will be those who have come to harm us. There are those who have come with guns and drugs, now we do not know if they have come to destroy our country. There are others who have come to have businesses and jobs for the children."

Integrated Settlements

Security - "If they are going to be settled, and not given the said services, these refugees might commit crimes." - "Some of the local residents can't be given access to some of the benefits like healthcare, which will lead to chaos. It can also cause terrorism." - "There shall be insecurity, and health and education facilities' shortages." - "Refugees having conflict with the local people." - "You won't be knowing their behaviour; some might be criminals." - "The number of terrorists will increase, large numbers of children in schools." - "Over population. Can displace Kenyans. Insecurity." - "Al-Shabaab will attack Kenya if we won't have good security."

Economy - "It will have a positive impact. When donors help them with needs like medical care, it will also benefit other Kenyans." - "It will have a positive effect, because it won't affect the economy, reason being they will be under NGOs." - "It will help Kenyans in the education sector once NGOs bring the services." - "Better medical services will be offered by the NGOs." - "I think it will help so many people get health services, clean water and infrastructure development." - "Medical

services such as medicine availability, and education, i.e. classroom construction and reading programs.” - “Services will be offered poorly; more attention to refugees and not Kenyans.” - “We have limited resources and it will lead to us sharing these limited resources.” - “It will increase population and reduce services.” - “Limited job opportunities, lack of shelter for citizens.” - “The benefit is that the society will increase, due to the donors, and the demerit is we will lose the culture we already have.”

Culture - “It will bring togetherness among the people, since the refugees are also human.” - “It will help the refugees get better health care. We will also learn from people of different countries.” - “Refugees are like people as us. Services they receive will be equal and not excluded.” - “It will integrate the people from other countries together with the Kenyans. I think they’re coming from maybe across-border conflict issues to a safer zone in Kenya, so it will integrate them, and also we can learn from them things that can help the country. It will strengthen our border relations.” - “Relationship between Kenya and East African countries; cultural interaction between Kenyans and refugees.” - “There will be a mixture of culture. They’re used to their traditions, but now they’ll find a new tradition in Kenya.” - “There will be no impact since we’re not at war. If someone comes here from Congo there is no problem, provided they’re good people.” - “It will interrupt the Kenyans’ cultural activities.” - “If Congo stays with Somalia, and Maasais go to Kipsigis or Nandi, will they really stay well? So people who come from far to stay with others — can they stay well, really?”

Nationality Experiment

Control

Humanitarian / Future Displacement - “We’re human and it’s not good to see your fellow [human] suffer or bleed. You have to care about the other’s life like you care about your own.” - “They are poor, they have been tortured, they lack food in their country, that’s why they come here, then they should be free to look for food.” - “Because they don’t run away from their countries because of pleasure but for security purposes hence we should accommodate them.” - “They’re human and they’re supposed to be helped. The same way it might [become] worse in Kenya and we run to their country. It’s brotherhood.” - “Do to your neighbor what you will also want to be done to you.”

Security - “Some are brought because there is no food in their countries but there are some who are criminals and have come to destroy our country.” - “Because they are running away from wars and they might carry the same into our country.” - “It is because you hear that refugees have brought guns into Kenya, they have stolen cattle, disaster is happening.” - “Those refugees are coming to Kenya and they are planning to disturb the people of Kenya.” - “They need proper screening to avoid hosting criminals.” - “Children in our country may adopt bad behaviors from them.”

Positive Economy - “Because refugees are hardworking it will improve the economy of the country.” - “Most of the refugees are blooming in business more than Kenyans. The interaction they bring to our country will help us upgrade by bringing new ideas and different ways of managing business. You’ll find most refugees are very successful more than Kenyans. It brings us together.”

Negative Economy - “If we cannot feed ourselves what will we feed them? We are suffering and we do not have surplus.” - “They bring stiff competition in the job market. Results in high cost of living.” - “They will lead to unemployment and overpopulation.” - “Kenyan government will be focusing on them more than us for things like water supply and food.” - “They act like they belong here. They take jobs that are made for us.” - “It’s like you want to welcome visitors in your home but you already have like 8 children to take care of... You’ll have more problems, you have to work hard too to actually be able to fulfill all of this. That is the same feeling we’ll have in our country. In as much as we want to promote [refugees], we have a big problem already and our economy cannot allow.”

South Sudanese

Humanitarian / Future Displacement - “[I support] because of humanity. What’s happening in Khartoum or Juba... life [there] is not good. We’re all humans, children need to go to school.”

Security - “They are spreading brutality in Kakuma.” - “Most of Pokot bandits get their weapons from Sudan.” - “Because Kenyans spoke for them to get freedom so they should go back to build their country. They bring a lot of crime and hard drugs.”

Positive Economy - “We are benefiting from the refugees. We get employment from the camp. Turkana ladies work there and get money.” - “Because the hosting communities will also benefit from the support given to refugees.” - “The NGOs involved create job opportunities to Kenyans.” - “Wood and charcoal business is flourishing due to refugees.”

Negative Economy - “In Southern Sudan there is now [no] war. They are lazy, let them go back to their country.” - “The don’t help Kenya in any way in generating revenue i.e., paying taxes. There are other countries like Ethiopia, why don’t they go there.”

Somali

Humanitarian / Future Displacement - “Let’s take [a situation where]... my country poses [a] danger to my life and I ran to another country. I will need to be treated well, for instance in Somalia.”

Security - “Somalis I can’t support because they have a bad blood. Most of them are alshabab. Somalis are not good. Tanzanians are here and we don’t have a problem, even Ugandans are here in Mombasa and Nairobi but they don’t have a problem... but Somalis, they have alshabab and so many things.” - “They are the ones disturbing people here in Kenya. Even now they’re bringing problems in Garissa, planting bombs. So, you can’t trust them... even their kids you can’t trust. They’re trained from childhood.” - “Because if you look at people who attacked the university where my sister was a student, most of them clearly

looked like Somalis, so we don't want them in our country." - "If you look at places like Lamu, we are always shown in the news that they have killed people. You see, people like them we save and they come to kill us. Yes, there are those who need help but there are others who do not come because of the help, they have come to bring us more harm than good."

Positive Economy - "The Somali people have money and thus make the Kenyan economy to rise." - "The Somalis in the country help create jobs and pay us to help our children." - "There are a number of Kenyans working in the camps and also some Kenyans go to get food from these camps."

Negative Economy - "Somalis have taken over most business opportunities." - "Somalis are occupying a lot of space hence making Kenya lose work opportunities." - "They are coming to destroy our business like they're so many in Eastleigh and no Kenyan can do business there."

E Additional analyses and study documentation

E.1 Comparing integration and hosting

A substantial minority of Kenyans support hosting refugees but not their integration, a position reflected in support for encampment. To examine who holds this view, we restrict the sample to respondents who chose either camps or full rights and model the choice of camps using a weighted logit. Table 21 reports average marginal effects in percentage points with HC1 standard errors.

Respondents who prefer camps are older, more likely to be male, more concerned about the national economy, more likely to live in a camp-hosting county, and less likely to be Kenyan Somali. Their own economic circumstances, including income, education, employment, and occupation, do not predict this choice, nor does close contact with refugees. The camp-county result may reflect the local economic benefits associated with camps: residents who benefit from camp-related employment, trade, or aid may prefer refugees to remain in camps rather than integrate fully into surrounding communities. This does not necessarily indicate greater hostility toward refugees, but rather a preference for the existing form of hosting.

Table 21: Who prefers camps rather than integration? (full sample)

	Prefers camps
Economic concerns	
Education (1 category)	0.17 (1.46)
Income (1 SD)	-0.29 (1.24)
Unemployment	2.93 (3.81)
Formal employment	-0.52 (3.74)
Informal employment	-3.10 (3.54)
Urban	-4.27 ⁺ (2.47)
Agricultural occupation	-0.34 (3.15)
Socio. econ. concern (1 SD)	2.88* (1.23)
Ethnic kinship and contact	
Kenyan Somali	-16.65*** (2.80)
Close contact	-2.45 (2.29)
Camp county	6.24* (3.08)
Controls	
Age (1 SD)	5.04*** (1.20)
Gender (Female = 1)	-9.47*** (2.23)
Prefers camps	369
Prefers integration	1,425
Observations	1,794

Notes: Average marginal effects, in percentage points, from a weighted logit estimated on respondents who choose either camps or full rights from the five-option policy menu. The outcome is an indicator for choosing camps, so a positive coefficient means the characteristic is associated with preferring containment over integration. Full sample, survey weights, HC1 robust standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, + $p < 0.10$.

E.2 Sub-Saharan Africa plots

Ten of the 15 largest protracted refugee situations are in sub-Saharan Africa, including South Sudan, Sudan, DRC, Somalia, CAR, Eritrea, Nigeria, Burundi, Rwanda, and Mali.




Figure 1: Refugee funding and camp population across regions

Note: Left panel, UNHCR annual budget by region (Global Focus, accessed October 2024). Right panel, camp population by region of asylum (UNHCR Data Finder), counting residents of planned or managed camps, collective centres, and reception or transit camps.

E.3 Deviations from the pre-analysis plan

This study was pre-registered before the baseline survey was fielded in September and October 2023. This section documents where the analysis departs from that pre-analysis plan (PAP).

E.3.0.1 Narrowing focus to integration. The PAP proposed analyzing support for refugee integration and for refugee hosting in parallel. The paper instead streamlines the focus on integration, given that this is what the Kenya’s 2021 Refugee Act is concerned with. However, we still analyze attitudes toward hosting, which we compare with attitudes towards integration in the main paper.

E.3.0.2 Reorganization of the hypotheses. The PAP listed ten hypotheses, which the paper streamlines into six: H1 corresponds to PAP-H1; H2 to PAP-H6; H3 to PAP-H2; H4 to PAP-H3; H5 combines PAP-H4 and PAP-H5; and H6 corresponds to PAP-H9. PAP-H8 and PAP-H10 are not stated as hypotheses. Instead, exposure to refugees is included in the correlates analysis using camp-county indicator, while personal or family displacement experience is included in the additional-covariates specifications. Similarly, we removed religion, marital status, and displacement experience as covariates (still reported in the appendix) and included analysis of formal and informal employment based on reviewer comments.

E.3.0.3 Outcome measures. The PAP designated an additive index combining support for Kenya hosting a refugee group with support for that group moving into the respondent’s own constituency as the primary outcome of the nationality experiment. We do not construct this index as, upon considering the survey question wording, the constituency-move item measures support for local integration rather than for hosting, since Kenya’s status quo policy is encampment and allowing refugees to move into and settle among host communities is a dimension of the new integration policy rather than a feature of hosting as currently practised. We therefore treat that item as an integration outcome and analyze hosting separately.

The PAP also named the ten-point feeling thermometer toward refugees as the primary dependent variable for the observational analysis. We report it as an additional outcome in this appendix. The PAP proposed to interact each moderator with the treatment indicators and to examine heterogeneous effects within and across arms. We conduct this analysis in the appendix rather than as primary.

E.3.0.4 Open-ended responses. The PAP said we would examine the open-ended responses qualitatively and potentially run sentiment analysis on them. We did not run sentiment analysis. Instead we built a codebook on a random 10 percent training sample and hand-coded every response.

E.3.0.5 Additional analyses removed or added. Several analyses reported in the paper or this appendix were not pre-specified: the comparison of respondents who prefer camps with those who prefer integration, which characterizes the gap between support for hosting and support for integration; the check for contamination from the survey flow, which re-estimates the nationality experiment among respondents assigned to the control arm of the policy experiment; the functional-form checks that relax linearity in the continuous covariates; and the comparison of the two nationality-experiment items reported above. In the other direction, the PAP proposed supplementing the survey with observational records such as police reports. Those were not available to us, and no analysis of them is reported. Finally, the binary integration outcome is modeled by weighted logistic regression, reported as average marginal effects in percentage points, rather than by OLS as proposed. The linear probability model is reported in this appendix and gives the same substantive answer.

E.3.0.6 No panel, 2026 repeated cross-section. The PAP proposed a panel survey, but implementation of the integration policy was too slow for the planned follow-up to capture meaningful change. Instead, a national survey fielded in February 2026 for a separate project repeated several questions from the 2023 survey and added questions about the Shirika Plan. The two waves are independent samples and use different population weights, so comparisons of levels should be treated with some caution.

Attitudes were broadly stable between 2023 and 2026 (Figure~2; Table~22). Support for hosting refugees was unchanged, while willingness to have refugees live locally increased slightly. Support for full rights and integrated settlement also rose modestly, and support for returning refugees declined. However, support for work rights and freedom of movement fell slightly, while support for integrated settlements in the policy experiment was unchanged.

Awareness of the Shirika Plan remained low at 11.6%. Among those aware of it, 75.6% supported the plan, although most could not explain what it involved. Correct descriptions, such as integrated settlements (13%) and work rights (11%), were more common than incorrect claims about citizenship (3%) or camp closures (1%). Awareness was much higher in Kakuma (54.5%), but support was lower (41.4%) and the mistaken belief that the plan grants citizenship was more common (20%).



○ 2023 ● 2026

Figure 2: Change in support for refugee integration, 2023 and 2026

Note: Weighted share rating each item 4 or 5 on the five-point scale, nationally representative sample in each wave, with 95 percent confidence intervals; the top two panels use the three treated policy arms only. The own-area item in the bottom panel is worded slightly differently in the two waves, so that comparison is approximate.

Table 22: Support for refugee integration policies, 2023 and 2026

	2023	2026	Change
<i>Panel A. Support for the policy shown (% supporting)</i>			
Work rights	69.3 (2.3)	63.5 (2.0)	-5.8 ⁺ (3.1)
Free movement	59.9 (2.4)	50.9 (2.0)	-8.9** (3.1)
Integrated settlements	73.2 (2.2)	71.7 (2.0)	-1.5 (2.9)
<i>All three pooled</i>	67.4 (1.3)	61.6 (1.2)	-5.9*** (1.8)
<i>Panel B. Relative difference vs. free movement (% supporting)</i>			
Work rights	9.4** (3.3)	12.5*** (2.8)	3.1 (4.4)
Integrated settlements	13.3*** (3.2)	20.7*** (2.8)	7.4 ⁺ (4.3)
Joint <i>p</i> (both arms)	0.000	0.000	0.215
<i>Panel C. Relative difference vs. free movement (five-point scale)</i>			
Work rights	0.392*** (0.113)	0.472*** (0.098)	0.080 (0.149)
Integrated settlements	0.451*** (0.116)	0.803*** (0.096)	0.352* (0.151)
Joint <i>p</i> (both arms)	0.000	0.000	0.047
Observations	1,865	2,013	3,878

Notes: Weighted least squares on the nationally representative sample of each wave, with post-stratification weights and HC1 robust standard errors in parentheses. The 2026 wave re-fielded the policy experiment with the same three vignettes and the same five-point support item; arms are matched on the verbatim vignette wording rather than on arm order. The 2026 replication fielded no control arm, which costs nothing here because the policy-support item was never asked of the 2023 control arm either. Panels A and B are in percentage points, where support is a rating of 4 or 5 on the five-point item. Panel C uses the full five-point scale in raw points, which retains all of the response variation; the pooled two-wave weighted standard deviation of that item is 1.65, so one point is 0.61 standard deviations. Estimates are deliberately not standardized within wave, because dividing each wave by its own standard deviation would change the scale being compared. The *Change* column is the 2026 estimate minus the 2023 estimate: in Panel A a wave coefficient estimated separately for each arm, and in Panels B and C the arm-by-wave interaction from the pooled difference-in-differences model. It is estimated on the unrounded data, so it can differ by 0.1 from the difference of the two rounded levels printed beside it; the pooled row of Panel A is the case here, where 61.5626 minus 67.4471 is -5.8845. Joint *p* is the omnibus test that both arm coefficients are zero, computed as a Wald test on the coefficient vector. Unlike the within-wave analysis, respondents already aware of the real Shirika Plan are retained in both waves: the waves do not measure awareness comparably and awareness itself rose between them, so conditioning on it would let a variable that changed over time drive the comparison. Imposing each wave's own restriction leaves every Panel C estimate within 0.04 points of the reported value. The two waves are independent cross-sections, not a panel. *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, + $p < 0.10$.

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